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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the democratisation of South Africa in 1994, new emphasis was placed on the 
role of structures of authority put in place by government. As in most other countries 
these structures operate on national, provincial and local levels. 
Particular prominence was placed on local authorities, responsible to act as 
custodians of the communities they serve by rendering essential services and 
products, upholding the local democracy and complying to the democracy’s 
developmental role within their jurisdiction.  
Management of local authorities are highlighted because of the direct and visual 
delivery of essential services to the communities they serve. The prominence of their 
responsibilities, more than in other spheres of government, are emphasised by the 
fact that its efficacy is critically and directly tested on an on-going basis by the 
communities within its boundaries – it affects the life and often the quality of life of 
almost everybody. 
Local authorities derive their status and power from the Constitution which states, 
inter alia, that the executive and legislative authority of municipalities is vested in 
their municipal council. Furthermore municipalities have the right to govern on own 
initiative the local government affairs of their communities subject to national and 
provincial legislation but with the proviso that these levels of government are not 
allowed to compromise or impede on the municipality’s ability or right to properly 
perform its functions or exercise its rights. 
In terms of the Constitution the municipal councils are democratically elected bodies 
based on the multiparty political dispensation of the community. In accordance the 
governance of a municipality is vested in the politically convictions and preferences 
of the council who, by virtue of legislation applicable to local authorities, is entitled to 
appoint the Municipal Manager and Managers reporting directly to it. Since councils 
are term bound elected bodies – which in addition may change its composition due 
to interim and by-elections and the transient nature of political expediencies – the 
appointment of municipalities’ senior executives are for limited duration only, with 
terms linked to those of the councils. 
This treatise will focus on the effect of the above on these managers and their ability 
to fulfil their constitutional duties with professionalism, fairness and objectivity whilst 
endeavouring to juggle community needs, political preferences, and self-preservation 
without impacting negatively on the provision of service of excellence.  
Specific attention will be given to practices that evolved within the sphere of local 
authorities pertaining to this type of employee and the compliances and conflicts of 
such with existing and proposed amended labour legislation – both factual and within 
the spirit and intent of the Constitution. 
 
Due to the intricate relationship between the different spheres of government and 
legislation involved, it was necessary to first deal with the background against which 
senior municipal managers are employed in order to discuss the employment 
relationship per se. 
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1 Chapter 1:  
1.1 Problem Formulation 
 
The South African government system, like others internationally, is structured on 
three levels, to whit the national, provincial and local government structures. 
  
The South African local government system, making provision for metropolitan 
councils, district municipalities and local municipalities operate closest to the 
communities they serve and their actions are discernable – and experienced – on a 
continuous basis by those they are required to serve.  
 
The Batho Pele principle is propagated by the local authorities as a slogan to remind 
people what municipalities stand for – “we serve the people”. This principle implies 
corruption free governance, public accountability, clean administration aimed at 
efficient, equitable and sufficient service delivery with the involvement of the 
communities within the municipality’s demarcated area and transparent and credible 
governance. This means that the discipline and integrity required by the officials 
serving the public supersedes the expectations from other sectors of the community 
and that the democratic principles are adhered to. The former Premier of the 
Western Cape expressed the approach in this manner: “Corruption is a corrosive evil 
that robs our country … of precious resources which should be used to fight poverty, 
create jobs and improve the lives of all our people1”. 
 
Yet, in the pre-math to the local government elections of 2011 and increasingly so 
since then, “the people” to be served vociferously and in many instances 
aggressively and violently demonstrated their dissatisfaction with service delivery 
and the attention – or the lack thereof – their often declared grievances received.  In 
the aftermath to the elections, this has become an on-going trend and has spread all 
over South Africa.  
 
Local authorities are by virtue of their proximity to the proverbial “coal face”, also the 
first line in the political struggle for supremacy. Since 1993, but statutory from 2000, 
all local authorities are led by politically based councils.  
1 Promoting Good Governance and Accountability issued by the Department: Provincial and Local Government, undated. 
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 These councils perceive that they can best serve their constituents by ensuring that 
the senior officials executing the duties of the municipalities share their ideologies as 
well. The premise of this perception is that the chief executive officer of a 
municipality must pay allegiance to the council. Councils are however elected bodies 
for fixed terms, ergo to give realistic effect to the above, chief executive officers of 
municipalities should also be appointed on fixed terms coinciding with that of the 
councils. 
 
Although this might make political sense, the questions arising from practice are in 
most cases at the heart of the dissatisfaction about poor service delivery. It could be 
argued that part of the problem lies with the concept that a limited duration contract 
makes for uncertainty of tenure and that senior municipal officials might find it 
expeditious to rather dance to the tune their political master play than to deliver the 
required, but sometimes political unpopular, product their communities clamour for. 
In addition, many may find it expeditious to keep other options open or even to use 
their offices to create contingencies for the eventuality of a change in the political 
preferences of the voters – which might well affect them and more often than not 
does.   
 
The above may be a major contributor to high and frequent turnover on the top level 
and does not contribute towards developing career managers or establishing 
professionalism and continuity in, or commitment to, local administration. Apart from 
that, the fairness principle that underpins labour practices may not necessarily be 
served best in the process. 
 
A further challenge to the already complex situation is posed by the proposed 
amendments to new labour legislation which envisage a restriction on limited 
duration contracts in general and the repetition of renewal of such without fair 
reason. 
 
It is thus hypothetically stated that:  
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The uncertainty of tenure of municipal managers, and those 
managers reporting directly to them, contributes to poor service 
delivery which negatively affects the abilities of local authorities 
to meet their constitutional obligations properly. The practice of 
limited duration appointments of senior management in 
municipalities might be considered as unfair due to the reason 
for appointment for specific terms only.  
 
The question that begs to be answered is thus whether the system can be adjusted 
to ensure security of tenure due to ability and to what extent can congruence be 
developed between the political drive of municipal councils and the professional 
service delivery of the officials that need to manage municipalities in the best 
possible manner.  
 
(This topical question was addressed by the State President shortly before the 
municipal elections in 2011 in a Freedom Day speech where he assured the voters 
that government would ensure the appointment of professional capable officials 
regardless of political affinity, race, colour or gender to manage the affairs of 
municipalities rather than to condone the practices of nepotism, cadre-deployment 
and favouritism exercised by many municipal councils at the cost of good and 
efficient governance. At the same time, however, he was criticised for postponing 
the signing of the amended Municipal Systems Act that would address some of the 
issues pertaining to the appointment of senior management in municipalities.)    
1.2 Purpose, Goal and Objective of the Research Study 
 
This treatise includes a survey of the legal framework in which municipal managers 
and the managers reporting directly to them operate; the structures that have a direct 
influence on their functionality; the socio-political environment that influences their 
working environment and their efficiency, and professional performance demands 
and agreements.  
 
This will be tested against the constitutional requirements pertaining to local 
governance and local community needs.  
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1.3 The Research Question 
 
To what extent is the apparent lack of efficient service delivery of municipalities a 
factor of insufficient professional leadership and the abilities of senior municipal 
management due to the adverse influence of political expediencies, uncertainty of 
tenure and the appointment in those positions of unqualified or unmotivated and 
uncommitted incumbents and to what extent is the above related to the terms and 
conditions of municipal appointees in terms of the 2011 amended Municipal Systems 
Act 32 of 2000, sections 56, 56A and 57 (read together with the previous section 82 
of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998)?  How would the 
recent approved amendments to the Municipal Systems Act in July 2011 affect this 
position and what would be required to normalise it?   
1.4 Research Approach 
 
The research in this treatise is based on the following approaches: 
 
• an analysis of legislation pertaining to the constitutional role, responsibilities 
and functions of local authorities as part of the national government 
structures; 
 
• an analysis of prevalent legislation regarding the appointment of municipal 
managers and the managers reporting directly to them; 
 
• an analysis of municipal structures to affect good governance and the role of 
managerial input to ensure such and 
 
• an analysis of the results of dispute resolution interventions relating to these 
appointees, including court cases. 
 
In this treatise the focus falls on the ability of the local authorities to perform their 
constitutional roles efficiently and to pay tribute to the Batho Pele principle bearing in 
mind the legal concepts involved in the appointment and discharging of municipal 
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managers and those managers reporting directly to them, commonly referred to as 
the section 56 and 57 appointees.  
 
In order to obtain the above, a literature study will be undertaken; records and 
statistics will be obtained and analysed from local authorities, district municipalities, 
municipal employee organisations, employers’ organisation and the South African 
Local Authorities Bargaining Council.  
 
1.5 Changes in Municipal legislation 5 July 2011 
 
The municipal legislation pertaining to the appointment, accountabilities and 
responsibilities as well as the scope of authority and duties of senior municipal 
managers were, prior to July 2011, contained in the Local Government: Municipal 
Structures Act and the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act.  
 
The prescripts contained in particularly the Local Government Systems Act, 
pertaining to these accountabilities, duties and obligations, before and after the July 
amendments (Act 7 of 2011) have a direct bearing on various other local government 
acts, e.g. the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000; the Local 
Government: Municipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998; the Local Government: 
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003, etc. The changes affected through 
Act 7 of 2011 however only pertain to the Systems and the Structures Acts. The 
National Treasury gazetted Minimum Competency Levels Regulations (Gazette 
29967 of April 2012) applicable to senior municipal managers but the implementation 
date of these regulations contained in the Municipal Finance Management Act 
(sections 83, 107 and 119) only become effective in 2014. 
 
The accountabilities, duties and obligations of incumbents in senior municipal 
positions were contained in sections 56 and 57 of the Local Government: Municipal 
Systems Act 32 of 2000, prior to the 2011 amendments, whilst the appointment of 
the municipal manager was dealt with in section 82 of the Local Government: 
Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. 
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Act 7 of 2011 repealed section 82 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures 
Act. Instead a section 54A was added to the Local Government: Municipal Systems 
Act in July 2011 dealing with the appointment of municipal managers and acting 
municipal managers in place of the repealed section 82 of the Structures Act. 
Section 54A in the amended Systems Act requires in section 54A(2) that the 
municipal manager should not only have the relevant skills and expertise to perform 
the duties associated with the post but should also have the competencies and 
qualifications as prescribed. Section 54A(3) emphasises this aspect by stating that 
an appointment would become null and void if the appointed municipal manager 
does not have the prescribed skills, expertise, competencies or qualifications. 
Subsection (8) confers power on the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for 
Local Government to act within a specified time frame on a contravention of the 
procedure by a municipality. The MEC has to take “appropriate steps” to enforce 
compliance which may even include a court application for a declaratory order on the 
validity of the appointment. Failing this, subsection (9) makes provision for ministerial 
intervention. 
 
Another important addition to this section is the stipulations dealing with acting 
municipal managers. An acting municipal manager may not hold office in that 
capacity for more than three months unless the MEC has approved an extension 
motivated for in a written application from the particular municipality.   
 
Section 54A further prescribes the process for filling the position of a municipal 
manager if the position becomes vacant in subsections (4) and (5). It also provides in 
subsection (6) for the MEC to second a suitable person, or if the MEC fails to do so, 
for the involvement of the Minister for Local Government to fill the position.  
 
The above amendments were introduced to improve the quality of service delivery of 
municipalities by ensuring the appointment of suitably qualified and competent 
municipal managers rather than allowing the practices that occurred at many 
municipalities where the positions, carrying a high salary and attractive perks, were 
reserved for cadre deployment and nepotism at the cost of the communities. 
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In the amended Systems Act, section 55 deals with the duties, obligations and 
accountabilities of the municipal manager.  
 
A section 56A was added to the Systems Act to give effect to the statement made by 
State President Zuma in his Freedom Day speech, referred to above. This section, 
under the heading “Limitation of political rights of municipal managers and managers 
directly accountable to municipal mangers” now prevents senior municipal managers 
to hold office in political parties in any capacity. Section 56A is augmented with the 
insertion in the definition of “political office” in Section 1 of the Systems Act. This 
definition describes political office in relation to a political party or a structure thereof.   
 
The most important amendment to section 56 of the Systems Act makes the 
permanent appointment of a manager reporting directly to the municipal manager 
possible (section 56 (7)). 
 
More amendments were made, e.g. 57A, which however do not necessarily have a 
direct bearing on the senior municipal managers. 
 
The 2011 amended Systems Act also contains the applicable regulations, including 
the amended Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers2 referred to later in this 
treatise. 
 
In this treatise, reference to the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 
2000, in the text and footnotes, pertains to the amended act of July 2011, unless 
otherwise indicated either directly or through the context. Changes to the municipal 
legislation affecting the municipal manager or managers reporting directly to him, not 
specifically mentioned above, will be indicated in the text and specified through the 
footnotes. Due to the date of change of the legislation referred to above, most of the 
literature used as references still cited legislation prior to the changes. Where such 
texts were directly quoted in the text, reference was made of the current legislation in 
the footnotes.   
  
2 Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers GN 344 in GG 34213 of 21 April 
2011. 
12 
 
                                            
2 Chapter 2   
 
2.1 The Structure of Levels of Government in South Africa 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (hereinafter referred to as the 
Constitution)3 determines in chapter three that the government of South Africa 
comprises of national, provincial and local spheres of government which are 
distinctive of each other, yet interdependent and interrelated4.  
 
The basic values and principles that warrant the existence and functioning of these 
spheres of government and all organs of state and public enterprises5 are depicted 
in section 195 of the Constitution. These are: 
• public administration governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined 
in the Constitution; 
• the promotion and maintenance of a high standard of professional ethics; 
• the effective and responsible utilisation of resources; 
• a development-oriented Public Administration; 
• impartial, fair, unbiased and equitable service provision; 
• responsiveness to people’s needs and public awareness and participation in 
government and policy making; 
• accountable public administration; 
• fostering of transparency by providing the public with timely, accessible and 
accurate information; 
• the cultivation of good human resource management and career-development 
practices, to maximise human potential and 
• the reflection of the national and local demography of the population in 
employment practices based on ability, objectivity and fairness with the 
understanding that past imbalances has to be addressed to achieve broad 
representation. 
    
3 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
4 S40. 
5 Craythorne Municipal Administration 6th Ed (2006) 117. 
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The relationship between the different levels of government is ruled by 
intergovernmental relations6, which refers to the way in which the different spheres 
of government interact and relate to each other7.  The framework within which this 
should be done is provided for and promoted in the Constitution and other legislation 
directly derived from it and relates to the principles of cooperative government and 
intergovernmental relations that must be followed by all spheres of government and 
structures in South Africa8.    
 
The necessity for intergovernmental relations is emphasised by the fact that all levels 
of government in the pursuance of their individual and respective functions are 
interdependent on common resources needed to carry out their constitutional 
mandate. These are classified by Kahn et al as constitutional and legal resources, 
financial resources, political resources and information resources9. 
 
In as far as the local authorities have a specific interdependent but autonomous10 
function within the governmental structure their relationship with the other spheres of 
government is of a sensitive nature11 which from time to time affects the efficacy of 
these authorities. 
 
Local authorities are responsible to act as the custodians of the interests of the 
communities they serve by rendering essential services and products, upholding the 
local democracy and complying with the democracy’s developmental role within their 
jurisdiction12. In that sense they are extremely dependent of the communal national 
resources and find themselves more vulnerable13 than their provincial and national 
counterparts.  
 
This fact, as far as the interdependence on the political resources is concerned, was 
again highlighted during the 2011 municipal elections where voters were wooed on a 
6 Kahn, Madue & Kalema Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa (2011) 11. 
7 Constitution s41(2). 
8 Kahn et al 11. 
9 9. 
10 Constitution s151. 
11 Kahn et al 8 - 9. 
12 Venter, Van der Walt, Phutiagae, Khalo, van Niekerk, Nealer & Van der Waldt (editor)  Municipal Management: Serving the People 
(2010) 2 and 12.  
13 Kahn et al 41. 
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national basis and many apparently cast their votes based on that sentiment 
regardless of their often and repeated declarations of disenchantment with local 
service delivery14. National sentiments in that sense influenced the choice and 
appointment of the executives in charge of municipalities rather than the local 
realities, needs and imperatives. The influence of the local community gets therefore, 
contrary to the intent and the spirit of democracy, diminished by that same 
community’s willingness to be guided by national political sentiments rather than the 
realities of a lack of evidential good governance on grass root levels15.   
 
The management of the resources within a local authority resides with the 
administrators appointed to apply such to the best interests of the community but 
based on the perceptions of those interests by the decision making body (i.e. the 
local council).  
 
It is a statutory requirement that there must be a municipal manager for each 
municipality16.  
 
“The municipal council must appoint –  
a) a municipal manager as head of the administration of the municipal council; or 
b) an acting municipal manager under circumstances and for a period as 
prescribed17.” 
 
The appointment of municipal administrators to meet the requirements of the 
Constitution takes place in terms of labour legislation, municipal legislation and 
agreements18 but is dictated to a large extent by the political sentiments of the voters 
manifested in the elected municipal councils. It would therefore be fair to assume 
that to consider the question of the efficacy of municipal management properly one 
14 On 27 April 2011 in the run-up to the municipal elections the State President, Mr Zuma, stated in a Freedom Day address that the 
National government will intervene to ensure the appointment of qualified and professional management for local authorities, despite 
political sentiment, in order to ensure improved service delivery. (RSG News Bulletin 06:00 28 April 2011). 
15 News headlines on 7 June 2011 referred to tension between the ANC and ANC municipalities where councillors elected their own 
mayors despite party prescriptions and of unrest and even violence in the North West Province where voters were grossly dissatisfied with 
ANC candidates, particularly so since the party promised a week before the elections - when it was already too late to change their list of 
candidates - that the dissatisfaction will be attended to after the elections. (RSG News Bulletins 06:00 7 June 2011). 
16 Craythorne 118. 
17 Formerly s82 of Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998; since 2011 section 54A of the Amended Local Government: 
Municipal System Act. 
18 Main Agreement and performance agreements. 
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has to take cognisance of not only the constitutional and legal resources but also of 
the national financial and political resources19. 
 
2.2 The constitutional framework 
 
Chapter three of the Constitution states inter alia that all spheres of government are 
charged with the responsibility of securing the well-being of the people of South 
Africa20; providing “effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government”21; 
adhere to the constitution and be loyal to it and to the people of the country22; pay 
respect to the constitutional status, institutions, responsibilities, powers and functions 
of the other spheres of government23; exercise their respective responsibilities in 
conjunction with each other but without interference with the integrity of each other in 
a cooperative manner24. 
 
The Three Spheres of Government in South Africa: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 Kahn et al 9 
20 Constitution s 41(b). 
21 S41(c). 
22 S41(d). 
23 S41(e). 
24 SS41(g) and (h). 
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The Local Government [Chapter  7 Constitution, s151] 
Category A Municipalities 
[155(1)(a)] 
Category B Municipalities 
[155(1)(b)] 
Category C Municipalities 
[155(1)(c)] 
The Provincial government [Chapter 6 Constitution, s104] 
The National Government: Parliament [Chapter 4 Constitution, s44] 
National Assembly [44 (1)(a)] The National Council of Provinces [s 44(1)(b)] 
                                            
Although the above is an indication of the cascading of levels of authority, the 
dispensation of co-operative governance since 1994 and more particularly so since 
2000 can more realistically be depicted as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the level closest to the people, local government deliver a wide variety of 
essential services25. 
 
Chapter four of the Constitution provides for the status and responsibilities of the 
national sphere of government which consists of the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces26, whilst section 42(2) makes provision for these two 
bodies to participate in the legislative process to govern South Africa.  
 
In terms of section 42(3) the National Assembly represents all the people of South 
Africa and must ensure government by the people under the Constitution. It does so 
by “choosing the President, by providing a national forum for public consideration of 
issues, by passing legislation and scrutinising and overseeing executive action”. The 
National Council of Provinces represents the provinces in order to ensure that the 
provincial interests are not neglected in the national sphere of government27. 
 
The Constitution describes in section 55 the powers vested in the National 
Assembly. In terms of section 55 it may “pass, amend or reject” any legislation 
submitted to it and initiate or prepare legislation, excepting money Bills28. It must 
also ensure accountability of all executive organs of state in the national sphere of 
25 Craythorne 17. 
26 Constitution s42(1). 
27 S42(4). 
28 S55(1)(a) and (b). 
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government and oversee the exercise of national executive authority, including 
implementation of legislation; and “any organ of state”29.  
 
The powers of the National Council of Provinces are derived from section 68 of the 
Constitution, which is limited to legislation falling within its functional area described 
in schedule four of the Constitution30. These functional areas are listed in parts A 
and B of the schedule. Some of the functional areas overlap with those of the 
National and Local government spheres, for example aspects of disaster 
management; health services; housing; pollution control and public transport31.  
 
The governance of the provinces (provincial sphere of government) is derived from 
chapter 6 of the Constitution which states that the Legislative authority of the 
provinces are “vested in its provincial legislature, and confers on the provincial 
legislature the power” to pass legislation within the functional areas as described in 
schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution32.  
 
The provincial spheres of government may consider, pass, amend or reject any Bill 
submitted to the provincial legislature in addition to the initiation or preparation of 
applicable legislation33, excepting money Bills34. As is the case with the national 
sphere, the provincial governments must ensure that organs of state act in 
accordance to their mandates and are accountable to the provincial legislature35. A 
member of the Executive Council of a province may however assume where and 
when applicable any power or function deemed necessary that is “to be exercised or 
performed in terms of an Act of Parliament or a provincial Act” at a Municipal 
Council36. Such an assignment must be in terms of an agreement between 
Executive Council and the Municipal Council, must be in keeping with the relevant 
power or function to be performed and on proclamation of the Premier of the 
Province37  
29 S55(2)(b)(ii). 
30 Schedule 4 of the Constitution describes the “Functional Areas of Concurrent National and Provincial Legislative Competence”. 
31 See also ss155(6)(a) and (7) applicable to local authorities. 
32 S104. 
33 S114(1). 
34 S77.  
35 S114(2). 
36 S126. 
37 Ss126 (a) to (c). 
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 The accountability of the national and provincial spheres of government is entrusted 
to the executives of these spheres, the parliament38 and executive councils39 
respectively.  
 
The status of the local sphere of government is addressed in chapter 7, section 151 
of the Constitution. According to this section, the executive and legislative authority 
of municipalities is vested in their councils. The constitutional objectives of local 
government is contained in section 152 and are listed as the provision of democratic 
and accountable government on this level; ensuring provision of sustainable service 
to communities; development of social and economic aspects within the 
communities; the promotion of safe and healthy environments and the involvement 
of the communities and community organisations in matters of local government. It 
states further that “a municipality must strive, within its financial and administrative 
capacity, to achieve the objects40” as set out as objectives for local government.  
 
2.3 The Delegation of Executive Powers: 
 
The Constitution section 99 assigns a Cabinet member powers and functions that 
are required to exercise or perform duties in terms of the Constitution and in keeping 
with an Act of Parliament. This may include assigning of duties to a member of a 
provincial Executive Council or to a Municipal Council in terms of an agreement 
between the member of Cabinet and member of the provincial or local authority 
councils but must be consistent with the dictates of the Constitution and must also be 
encompassed by a proclamation by the President of South Africa.  
 
Likewise, a member of the Executive Council of a province may assign powers and 
functions in keeping with an Act of Parliament or a Provincial Act if so required to a 
Municipal Council41. 
 
38 Ss43 and 44. 
39 S133. 
40 S152 (2). 
41 Constitution s126. 
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The provinces have a Ministry of Local Government. The Ministry is responsible for 
the overseeing of local authorities within the province, and for the implementation of 
national and provincial development planning policy through the work of the 
Department of Local Government. 
 
On the national level a director general is the accounting official for the functioning of 
a government department42. The director general is directly answerable to the 
minister in whose portfolio the department resides. The ideal is that a director 
general is a competent and duly qualified official that can ensure the optimum 
functioning of a department43. In many instances the incumbents of these positions 
are selected and appointed based on their competencies and their abilities to deal 
with challenges faced by the departments in keeping with the requirements of the 
Constitution44. The cascading of authority and delegations is required to filter down 
through provincial government to the local authorities. 
 
Another important aspect and often neglected subject in considering governance 
issues in South Africa and which closely links in with the role of municipalities, is the 
issue of Traditional Leadership and Governance. From outset the position of 
traditional leaders within Councils was clad in controversy. The Organisation of 
Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTROLESA), was concerned that the new 
local and district councils would diminish the status and powers of Chiefs and that 
the boundaries cutting across the old traditional areas would enable the local 
authority to challenge their positions45. Act 4146 went a long way in allaying these 
concerns. In the preamble to the Act it is stated that it provides for the recognition of 
traditional communities, councils and a statutory framework for leadership as well as 
the functions and roles of traditional leaders and the houses of traditional leaders. It 
further states that the institution of traditional leadership must, inter alia “promote the 
principles of co-operative governance in its interaction with all spheres of 
government and organs of state.  
 
42 Kahn et al 80 – 82. 
43 The prescripts of the Constitution dictates that service delivery should be of a quality that addresses the needs of the community in an 
equitable and efficient manner, s95, Chapter 2 and s41. 
44 S41. 
45 Van der Waldt et al 16. 
46 Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act and Reg 41 of 2003. 
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The Constitution acknowledges the role and functions of traditional leaders in the 
South African structures of governance47 and in section 212(1) it is stated that 
national legislation may provide for these leaders as “an institution at local level”, 
hence Act 41 of 2003 in compliance with Constitution section 212(2). 
 
For the purpose of this treatise reference to the role of Act 41 will be made where 
and if applicable but the influence and specific roles of traditional leaders will only be 
addressed where and if it has a direct bearing on the roles of municipal managers or 
those managers reporting directly to them. 
 
2.4 Local Government 
 
From 1995 to 2000, four significant pieces of legislation pertaining to municipal 
administration were passed, i.e. the Organised Local Government Act 52 of 1997; 
Municipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998; Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 and the 
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. In 2003, the Local Government: Municipal 
Finance Management Act was added to this list.    
 
The Organised Local Government Act provides for the establishment of the South 
African Local Government Association (SALGA) to represent municipalities; the 
Municipal Demarcation Act determines the boundaries and wards of municipalities 
and the Municipal Structures Act defines amongst other issues the categories and 
types of municipalities, the establishment of such, the electoral systems and, up to 
June 2011, the appointment of the Municipal Manager48. 
 
The legal status of local government structures is confirmed in the Municipal 
Systems Act49, stating that a municipality (regardless of its type) is an organ of state 
with legislative and executive powers within demarcated areas in terms of the Local 
Government: Demarcation Act 27 of 1998. 
  
47 Ch 12 of the Constitution. 
48 Van der Waldt et al 15. 
49 32 of 2000 s2(a), which was amended on 5 July 2011 as the Local Government: Municipal Systems Amendment Act 7 of 2011 but will 
be referred to as the Local Government : Municipal Systems Act in the text and footnotes unless otherwise indicated. 
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The Constitution requires the national legislation to determine criteria for the 
categorisation of municipalities in an area50. The local government system of South 
Africa consists of three types of municipalities, i.e. Category A, B and C 
municipalities51.  
 
Category A municipalities are metropolitan municipalities52 with “exclusive municipal 
executive and legislative authority” in their areas53. Category B municipalities share 
their municipal executive and legislative authority with the category C or district 
municipalities within whose area they operate. Category C municipalities have 
municipal executive and legislative authority in areas for which the district council is 
responsible that may include more than one local municipality54 to realise the ideal of 
complete coverage in conjunction with traditional leaders in terms of the Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Act.  
 
The Constitution further requires that national legislation has to establish criteria and 
procedures to determine municipal boundaries55 by an independent authority56. In 
terms of section 155(5) of the Constitution the provincial authorities have to 
determine the different types of municipality to be established in that province57. The 
Constitution, section 155(2) determines that national legislation must define the 
different types of municipality58. Although Parliament has defined types of all three 
categories of municipalities, they are divided into two groups: those with executive 
mayors and those with a collective executive system or executive committees59.  
 
2.4.1 District Municipalities 
 
50 Craythorne 45. 
51 57. See also Constitution ss151(2), 155 and 156(2), read together with ss2 – 6 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 
of 1998 (Municipal Structures Act). 
52 Craythorne however points out that Parliament may legislate Category A status to other areas as well. 
53 Van der Waldt et al 8. There are currently six “metro” municipalities in South Africa: Cape Town, Johannesburg, Gauteng (Pretoria), 
Ekurhuleni (East Rand) Ethekwini (Durban) and Nelson Mandela (Port Elizabeth).  
54 Ibid 8. 
55 Municipal Demarcation Act (Municipal Demarcation Act) s43(c). 
56 Constitution s155(3)(b) see also Craythorne 45 – 56. 
57 S104(1)(b)(iii) defers this power exclusively to the province. This is an executive and not legislative function in that it does not include 
the power to legislate on either process or procedure. (See also Craythorne 59.) 
58 Municipal Demarcation Act ss8-10. 
59 Craythorne 57 and 58. Craythorne states in this regard: “the collective executive system means an executive committee. The mayoral 
executive system means there is no executive committee and the mayor takes the place of that committee … it is the executive mayor 
system. Where there is no executive committee or executive mayor, the type is said to have the plenary system, that is, all executive 
power vests in the council.” 
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District Municipalities are organised and managed in the same manner as local and 
metropolitan municipalities. The structures and delegations are discussed below 
under “Local Municipalities”. 
 
2.4.2 Local Municipalities 
 
Local authorities are organs of state as contemplated in chapter 360 of the 
constitution. Chapter 7 of the Constitution deals specifically with local authorities and 
provide the guidelines on how to structure the functioning of the authority. 
 
The elected council for a local authority61 elect from its members a mayor62, to co-
ordinate its work, and is required to appoint as the chief executive officer of the 
municipality a Municipal Manager63. The mayor, dependent on the classification of 
the municipality may be an executive mayor64 in which instance more power is 
vested in its office. However, according to the dictates of section 151(4) of the 
Constitution the Council remains the supreme body65 in a municipality.  
 
The power of an executive mayor versus that of an executive committee and the 
influence of such on the functionality of the municipalities through the administrative 
hierarchy in terms of functionality and accountability will be addressed below.  
 
The position of an executive mayor is two-fold. In the first instance the executive 
mayor is the formulator of policy addressing the direction the municipality has to take 
in terms of its constitutional obligations and mandate. In the other instance the 
executive mayor manages the process required by the policies, needs of the 
municipality’s constituency and its field of responsibilities and he has to monitor 
processes and actions to achieve such. In both instances powers are delegated to 
the required levels of execution and expertise and ability66. The functions of the 
60 Constitution s40(1), see also s2. 
61 In terms of chapter 3 of the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 amended 1999, 2000 Schedule I (i.t.o. s93 of Act 27 of 2000 by s8 of 
Act 20 of 2002 and by ss22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 of Act 51 of 2002). 
62 s48 Local Government: Municipal Structures Act. 
63 Van der Waldt et al 8 referring to s82 Local Government: Municipal Structures Act prior to July 2011, now Local Government: Municipal 
Systems Act 54A. 
64 Craythorne 109. 
65 Ibid 109. 
66 Ibid 109. 
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executive mayor are defined through legislation67. The powers of the executive 
mayor are described in section 56(3) of the Municipal Structures Act. Craythorne 
refers in this regard to the American68 and German69 models. 
 
The executive committee system is in essence “a collective executive system which 
allows for the exercise of ‘the municipality’s’ executive authority through an executive 
committee in which the executive leadership of the municipality is collectively 
vested”70.71 Until June 2011, in terms of the Municipal Structures Act section 82 the 
municipal council appoints the municipal manager, but the process will be influenced 
by the vested seat of power of that council, that is either in the executive mayor or 
the executive committee, in terms of section 56 and section 54A under the conditions 
imposed by section 56A72 of the Municipal Systems Amendment Act of 2011. The 
second tier managers, those reporting directly to the municipal manager, are 
appointed in terms of section 56 of the Municipal Systems Act. 
   
Organisational Structure of the Executive Management Framework of 
Municipalities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 Municipal Structures Act s56(2). 
68 Craythorne 110, the so-called “strong mayor”. 
69 Ibid 110 referred to as the “strong mayor-council system”. 
70 Municipal Structures Act s7(a). 
71 Craythorne 113. 
72 Municipal Systems Act s56A, under the heading “Limitation of political rights of municipal managers and managers directly accountable 
to municipal managers” reads “A municipal manager or manager directly responsible to a municipal manager may not hold office in a 
political party, whether in a permanent , temporary  or acting capacity.” 
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The municipal manager is the head of the Council administration and for the overall 
functioning thereof; for managing the finances and for hiring and disciplining of 
staff73. In addition to the municipal manager, officials are appointed by council 
management to specific jobs within the municipal administration. The councillors are 
by law74 required to give direction and leadership to officials in the municipality to 
affect good governance75. The Council is responsible for the appointment of the 
officials that are necessary “for the effective performance” of the municipality’s 
functions76.  
 
The office of the municipal manager is to a certain extent the extension of the 
functions of the mayor of the Council. For this reason the manager and the mayor 
need to work in close conjunction. Personnel in the mayor’s office would be political 
appointees and, according to van der Waldt, should therefore have a fixed term 
contract similar to that of the mayor77. The Local Government – Municipal Systems 
Act was amended in 201178 to prevent politically expeditious (cadre-deployment) and 
nepotistic practices in the appointment of these officials and to endeavour to ensure 
competent and more professional input, good management in order to improve 
better service delivery and accountability and to make provision for applicable 
requirements of employment contracts and performance agreements79. 
 
2.4.3 Scope of Authority 
 
The Municipal Council is in terms of the constitution the supreme authority80 of a 
municipality and is in the democratic sense only answerable to the ‘people’81, the 
electorate. 
 
The first elections for local and rural councils took place in 1995. The demarcation of 
wards was at that stage done in such a way that half would represent the former 
73 Van der Waldt et al 8. 
74 Constitution s160(1)(a). 
75 Van der Waldt et al 8. 
76 Constitution s160(1)(d). 
77 Van der Waldt et al 78. 
78 Local Government: Municipal Systems Amendment Act 7 of 2011. 
79 Preamble to the Municipal Systems Amendment Act. 
80 Constitution s151(2). 
81 S152(1)(a). 
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segregated constituencies for whites, coloured and Asians whereas the other half 
would be representative of black voters regardless of numbers. Restructuring took 
place since then and the next elections on 5 December 2000 signified a dramatic 
change from the past. The demarcation process82 that started in June 2000 was 
completed in time for the elections and ensured ‘wall-to-wall’ representation83.  
 
The Council is compiled on a mixed ward – proportional representative basis84 and 
elects from its members a mayor85.  
 
The authority vested in executive mayors differ from those of mayors elected from an 
executive committee and affects the appointment and reporting lines of senior 
municipal managerial appointees. The executive mayoral committee, normally 
consisting of the executive mayor, chairperson, the deputy executive mayor86 and 
other by council elected/nominated members87, as the executive agent of the 
Council appoints the municipal manager88 through delegated powers by the Council.  
In the event of a council with an executive committee, the executive committee is the 
executive agent of the council and the role of the mayor differs considerably from 
that of an executive mayor89.  The executive committee has virtually the same 
powers as an executive mayor and is in terms of section 7(a) of the Municipal 
Structures Act a “Collective executive system which allows for the exercise of 
executive authority through an executive committee in which the executive 
leadership of the municipality is collectively vested.”90 
 
Although municipal managers were appointed in terms of section 82 of the Municipal 
Structures Act up to July 2011 and since then section 54A of the Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act, their duties and obligations are determined through the Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act91 and their contracts of employment in terms of 
82 Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998.  
83 Van der Waldt et al 15. 
84 Craythorne 72 and 73. 
85 Municipal Structures Act s48 (from the members of its executive committee if that applies); s60 (if it has more than 10 members) an 
executive mayor. See also Van der Waldt et al 107. 
86 If the MEC for Local Government approves in terms of s55 Municipal Structures Act. 
87 S43. 
88 S82. 
89 Craythorne 113. 
90 The executive powers of the Executive Mayoral Committee was put to test in the unreported SALGBC case Lourens and IMATU obo 
Jordaan v Oudtshoorn Municipality (2007). 
91 Municipal Systems Act s55. 
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section 57 of that Act. In July 2011 the State President signed the Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Amendment Act of 2011 into power. In terms of 
section 54A the Municipal Council is responsible for the appointment of the municipal 
manager as “head of the administration of the municipality” and lists the conditions 
and procedures to be followed for advertising for applicants for the position.  
 
2.5 Summary: 
 
The Local government system is still subject to the developing of its role in the 
governance structure. Since 1995 local government in South Africa has for the first 
time in history been afforded a special status and asserted a distinct sphere of 
government where it is no longer a function of a national or provincial department. 
 
Despite this, the dynamics created through specific legislation poses great 
challenges and resulted in power struggles, socio-economic and political pressures, 
pressing local needs based on, often, irrational and unrealistic expectations. These 
will still take time to sort out.   
 
Van der Waldt highlights but a few of the most significant challenges local 
government will have to contend with, including inexperienced and or uncommitted 
officials and political representatives as well as vested interests and an organisation 
culture not conducive to new realities and imperatives. 
 
The long expected amendments to legislation pertaining to local government and 
more particularly the appointment of and terms and conditions applicable to 
municipal managers and managers reporting directly to municipal managers were 
promulgated in June 2011 and the effect of this legislation will only over time become 
noticeable. The most significant feature of these amendments to legislation is an 
effort to prevent overt political influence through the municipal manager by restricting 
activities and political affiliation in this position. 
 
Bearing in mind that local authorities are on the front line of the political interface with 
voters, is dependent on common sources and has to contest with national and 
provincial government for such, much is expected from them in terms of service 
27 
 
delivery and this service delivery can only manifest through the administration of 
efficient local government directed by municipal managers and those managers 
reporting directly to them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
3 Chapter 3 
 
3.1 The Municipal Manager and Managers reporting directly to the Municipal 
Manager: 
 
The administration of municipalities is effected through structures provided by the 
municipal councils. Although these structures are not political structures as such, 
they are subject to political control92. 
 
Each municipality has a council where decisions are made, and municipal officials 
and staff who carry out the work of the municipality”93. Municipal organisation differs 
from private sector organisations. Municipal organisation is much more entrenched 
with regulating legislation as well as its constitutional responsibilities and mandate94.  
 
Municipal officials are appointed by council management to particular jobs within the 
administration to ensure the necessary skills and abilities for compliance of the 
municipality with its constitutional mandate95. At the hand of Loughlin, as cited by 
van der Waldt96, four defining characteristics of the modern institution of 
municipalities are: 
 
• Multifunctionality – they assume responsibility for a broad range of functions; 
• discretion – to adapt activities or services to local needs; 
• taxation – to access sources to ensure financial ability and autonomy and 
• representation – to have direct periodic elections ensuring representation of the 
community in council. 
 
Apart from the last, where only the arrangement and administration of which has a 
direct bearing on the officials of the municipality, these characteristics are a direct 
function of the management of a municipality. 
 
92 Craythorne 117. 
93 Van der Waldt et al 9. 
94 Craythorne 189. 
95 Constitution Ch 7. 
96 Van der Waldt et al 9.  
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Craythorne argues that a municipality of itself consists of a series of, what he terms 
interlocking systems. These are social systems (communities in the area of the 
particular municipality); a system of government and representation; organisational, 
managerial and operational systems for the services that are provided; systems of 
needs pertaining to individuals as well as groups of people; systems for planning in 
order to meet hierarchical priority needs; allocative systems; a diplomatic system and 
a leadership/coordinative system or systems97.  
 
To enable municipalities to fulfil their constitutional mandate, they have to have the 
means to provide sustainable services98. Financial management issues – or for that 
matter the propensity to mismanagement – are arguably the biggest challenge that 
municipalities face today99.  
 
As attested by recent publicity in this regard, Kahn further argues that many 
municipalities are currently not creditworthy and that they lack the required sources 
of revenue because, partly at least, they lack the ability to collect such in an effective 
manner.  
 
Although this inability is not all due to poor governance and ineffective management, 
a considerable portion of the blame should be allocated there. “The combination of 
limited human resources and skills and restricted budgets are perhaps the two most 
significant constraints to the delivery of services at the local level”100. 
 
From the above it is evident that the role of the top echelon of management within 
local authorities is crucial for the compliance with the constitutional obligations of 
these bodies. 
 
The tension between municipal autonomy and the need to ensure effective delivery 
of national programmes101 is demonstrated through poor service due to poor 
97 Craythorne 121. 
98 190 – 191.  
99 Kahn et al 127. 
100 128. 
101 135. 
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coordination and inadequate, delayed action by officials and transmission of funds 
from higher to lower levels of government.  
 
In governmental structures, authority to perform essential functions is delegated to 
functional levels of execution. In the case of municipalities, as with other multi-
layered organisations, the ideal is to delegate authority to the level nearest to the 
execution function of the particular responsibility102.  
 
Delegation in itself is a management function as well as a legal concept with legal 
consequences103. The complexity of modern government systems requires 
delegation of functions through the chain of command. This becomes evident when 
the responsibilities and accountabilities of municipal managers are discussed below.  
 
Although delegation refers to organisation in the sense of governance, it is also 
applicable to those functionaries in the different layers of the organisation. The 
Municipal Systems Act is prescriptive of these delegations within municipalities. 
Municipalities must maximise operational and administrative efficiencies and provide 
for the necessary checks and balances104.    
 
3.1.1 The Municipal Managers: 
 
Municipal Managers are the accounting officers for municipalities. They are 
appointed in terms of section 54A of the Municipal Systems Act - and their term of 
tenure is linked to that of the Council105. A municipal manager as the chief executive 
officer of the municipality heads the administrative function of the municipality106.  
 
It is required of a municipal manager to have the skills, expertise, competencies and 
qualifications for the position107. In addition, due to the amendments affected to the 
Structures and Systems acts for local authorities in 2011, a municipal manager or a 
manager reporting directly to a municipal manager may not hold a political office in a 
102 Municipal Systems Act s51(k). 
103 Craythorne 121. 
104 Municipal Systems Act s59. 
105 S57(6)(a). 
106 Van der Waldt et al 9. 
107 Municipal Systems Act s54A(2). 
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political party in either a permanent or temporary or acting capacity whilst employed 
as manager for a municipality108. This clause was the result of much criticism about 
cadre deployment, nepotism, favouritism and pay-off appointments.  
 
3.1.1.1 Accountability   
 
 
The current municipal manager is a key figure in the successful management of the 
administration of a municipality and the duties associated with the position is 
generically spelled out in much detail, unlike the situation in the past.  
 
The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act in accordance with the White Paper 
on Local Government109 in section 55 provides detail of these tasks, obligations and 
duties and in section 55(2) states that the municipal manager is ultimately 
accountable for the financial management of the municipality’s affairs in compliance 
with the Local Government Finance Management Act 56 of 2003.  
 
According to section 55(1)(a) the municipal manager is responsible and 
accountable110 for the “formation and development of an economical, effective, 
efficient and accountable administration” which is described as the implementation of 
the municipality’s integrated development plan (IDP); the operation of the 
municipality’s performance management system, and response to local community 
needs and participation in the affairs of the municipality. 
 
Section 55 further requires the municipal manager to be responsible and 
accountable for the management of the administration; implementation of the IDP 
and the monitoring of the progress of the plan; management of service delivery in a 
sustainable and equitable manner; appointment of staff (other than section 56-
managers) subject to the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA); management, 
training and development of staff; maintenance and discipline of staff; management 
108 S56(A). 
109 GN 423 in Government Gazette 18739 13 March 1998. 
110 Although the two terms are often used interchangeable and synonymously (Oxford Concise Dictionary), responsibility generally refers 
to tasks and duties that need to be performed by the incumbent but which can be delegated to others whilst accountability generally 
means that the incumbent is ultimately answerable for all the tasks and duties allocated to it – a manger reporting directly to the municipal 
manager may be responsible for the financial management of the municipality’s budget but the municipal manager remains accountable 
for it.  
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of sound labour relations and compliance with labour legislation; providing 
assistance and advice to the political structures; management of communication 
between the administrative and political structures; ensuring that decisions made by 
the political structures are effected; administration and implementation of municipal 
by-laws and applicable legislation; facilitation of local community participation in 
municipal affairs; development and management of a feedback and assessment 
system pertaining to service delivery; implementation of national and provincial 
legislation applicable to the municipality and the performance of “any other function 
that may be assigned by the council”  as well as exercising of powers and executing 
of duties delegated by the council or sub delegated by other delegating authorities of 
the municipality111. 
 
One of the most important, and for that matter topical, tasks of the municipal 
manager is to fulfil his role as the accounting officer in terms of financial 
management for the municipality.  
 
It is trite that many municipalities are battling to make financial ends meet. Kahn 
referred to this by stating that financial management issues are the biggest challenge 
that municipalities have to contend with112. Kahn further points out local government 
have more powers to collect their own revenues and that a sizeable percentage of 
their budget is supposed to be self-generated. They are thus, theoretically at least, 
less dependent on the national “vertical division” of national revenue. In the 
2009/2010 National Budget 7.7% of national financial resources were allocated to 
local government113. The transfer of intergovernmental funds to local authorities is 
mainly aimed at helping them to strengthen their capacity to better service delivery 
and to combat social problems such as poverty, illiteracy and to provide 
employment. Intergovernmental transfer of funds to be administered by 
municipalities play three roles, i.e. addressing the structural imbalances between 
revenue available to municipalities and the expenditure responsibilities assigned to 
them; supporting national priorities as indicated through different sectoral policies, 
more particularly those focussed on access to sufficient services and establishing 
111 Municipal Systems Act s55(1)(b) – (q). See also Municipal Management 75 and Municipal Administration 271 – 274. 
112 Kahn et al 127. 
113 94. 
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incentives for good governance and the building of local government capacity “within 
a sound fiscal framework”. It seems however as if the overall system of transfer 
programmes might have reduced the “incentives of municipalities to remain 
accountable to their citizens or to abandon fiscal discipline”. The danger in this 
transfer of intergovernmental funds is that it is prescriptive and may undermine the 
initiatives by local authorities which should be focussed on local imperatives rather 
than those generically earmarked by national government. These funds are also not 
sustainable and resulted in insecurity in programmes embarked upon on local 
government level. Statistics show that municipalities other than the category A 
municipalities are far from reaching a sustainable level of generation of own funds 
and that the majority of municipalities are heavily dependent on the national 
transfers114 
 
As the accounting officer of the municipality the municipal manager has fiduciary 
responsibilities in that he must act with fidelity, honesty, integrity, transparency and 
in the best interest and service of the municipality when dealing with and managing 
its financial affairs115. He is responsible and accountable for all income and 
expenditure; all assets of the municipality and the discharge of all liabilities and 
compliance with the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act116. 
 
The municipal manager is in terms of section 55 of the Municipal Systems Act 
accountable for the IDP for the municipality. Kahn points out that as far as 
intergovernmental relations (IGR) are concerned, bearing in mind that the 
municipality is nearest to the proverbial coalface in the socio-political sense, many 
municipalities have failed dismally to meet their constitutional responsibilities as part 
of the integrated government system117. Kahn states “…it can be argued that while 
the status of local government has grown considerably since the abolition of 
apartheid, endemic weaknesses in the IGR system have accentuated weaknesses in 
the local sphere of government.” He ascribes these weaknesses to the inability of 
some municipalities to meet their administrative and financial obligations through 
114 92 - 99. 
115 Craythorne 271. 
116 Municipal Systems Act s55(2). 
117 Kahn et al 72. 
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lack of capacity – not only in numbers but also ability – which prevent them “to 
deliver the most basic services…118”  
 
The incapacities referred to has a direct bearing on the efficacy of municipal 
management and more particularly that of the municipal manager. 
 
The municipalities are required to be governed by the democratic values and 
principles set out in section 195 of the Constitution. Municipalities therefore have to 
meet the requirements of section 152119. These duties relate to the responsibilities of 
both the council and administration of a municipality120. The municipal manager has 
the responsibility to ensure compliance with the above; has the duty to report on an 
annual basis to this extent and will be held accountable in its performance review. 
 
Although section 195 is applicable to all levels of administration, prescriptions by law 
reflecting section 152 is only applicable to local authorities. 
 
Apart from the financial, development, liaison and service delivery responsibilities 
and accountabilities, the municipal manager is also responsible and accountable for 
the staffing of municipalities (except for those managers reporting directly to it)121.  
 
The municipal manager is responsible and accountable for the staffing of the 
municipality. In addition the utilisation and training of staff; management and 
maintenance of discipline and the maintenance and promotion of sound labour 
relations also forms part of the responsibilities and accountabilities of the municipal 
manager. Section 66 of the Municipal Systems Act, under the heading “Staff 
establishments”, requires of the municipal manager to develop within a policy 
framework provided by council and applicable legislation, a staff establishment for 
the municipality; provide job descriptions for each position on the staff establishment; 
attach to these positions the remuneration and conditions of employment and to 
provide a system for evaluation. All these must be submitted to council for approval. 
 
118 Kahn relies in this regard on studies conducted by SALGA, see footnote 72. 
119 Municipal Systems Act s50. 
120 S4. 
121 Ss55(1)(e) – (h). 
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Although many of these functions may be delegated to other levels of management, 
the accountability ultimately remains with the municipal manager, who is answerable 
to council in this regard. 
 
Van der Waldt aptly states that people are the lifeblood of municipalities122. He 
singles out municipal officials, administrative assistants and municipal managers. He 
argues that no matter how effective the systems, processes and procedures might 
be, “… if people do not have the right mind set, skills and level of commitment 
(typically influenced by factors such as rewards, working conditions and leadership), 
or a pleasant work environment, things will not be done effectively and efficiently.”  
 
The key points emphasised are that the people employed by municipalities need 
adequate training, the right motivation123 and positive and effective leadership.  
 
Section 66(3) states that no person may be employed in a municipality unless the 
position in which the incumbent is employed is provided for in the staff 
establishment. If proper leadership, deployment, motivation and training and 
development of skills are lacking and is not cascaded through the different levels of 
the municipality, service delivery is due to suffer124.  
 
Human resources development is addressed in section 67 of the Municipal Systems 
Act whilst section 68 addresses capacity building. 
 
3.1.1.2 Managers Reporting Directly to the Municipal Manager 
 
Section 50(i) of the Municipal Systems Act holds the municipal manager accountable 
for the overall performance of the administration. The managers reporting directly to 
the municipal manager are appointed by council, or by the executive committee if the 
committee has received the delegated power to do so125, after ‘consultation’ with the 
122 Van der Waldt et al 119. 
123 In a news report of the Sowetan dated 19 October 2012, under the heading “Paid for Loitering” reporter Patience Bambalele writes that 
an employee of Ekurhuleni Municipality, Rejoice Marota, has been paid for doing nothing for the last six years. According to the report 
Marota has nothing to do, have no official position in the municipality but is being paid to be there. She earns a gross salary of R15000-00 
per month. She has been receiving annual increases and bonuses since 2007, costing the municipality about R1.8m. 
124 Van der Waldt et al 114 – 115. 
125 Craythorne 194.  
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municipal manager126 and are commonly referred to as section 56-appointees (as 
opposed to municipal managers who were up to June 2011 referred to as section 57 
managers due to the description of their contracts in that section).  
 
On face value, and from time to time in practice127, the fact that the municipal 
manager cannot appoint officials of his choice may pose friction and poor 
cooperation on this critical level of local government. In terms of the amended 
section 56 of the Municipal Systems Act it is not clear whether the intention is that 
these managers would also only be appointed on limited duration contracts. Again, 
due to the specific nature of functioning on this level, appointments that do not carry 
the blessing of the political overseer, may cause friction and may even be 
dysfunctional128.  
 
As is the case with municipal managers, section 56-appointees are also restricted 
from holding an office in a political party129. 
 
Functions for which the municipal manager is responsible and accountable in terms 
of municipal legislation are in many instances delegated130 to section 56-appointees 
who are generally elected and appointed in terms of their specialist training, 
background and expertise.  
 
These managers normally have designated job titles derived from their functions, 
such as ‘Manager: Corporate Services’ which would include responsibilities like legal 
services and human resources as sub delegations131.  
 
The contract requirements of section 56-appointees are also well defined in the 
Municipal Systems Act132 and are dealt with together with that of the municipal 
manager in more detail. 
126 Municipal Systems Act s56. 
127 See footnote 86. In  this instance two section 56-managers were appointed to the Oudtshoorn Municipality. A political division in the 
council however prevented the appointments to be ratified by council and eventually the appointments were placed in dispute. The 
municipal manager at the time however insisted that the appointments were legitimate and valid. His services were terminated shortly 
after and the two appointees were dismissed. 
128 Lottering & others v Stellenbosch Municipality (159/2010) [2010] ZALC 67; [2010] 12 BLLR 1306 (LC); 2010 31 ILJ 2923 (LC) (7 May 
2010). 
129 Municipal Systems Act s56A. 
130 Craythorne 126.  
131 127. 
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3.1.1.2.1 Employment Contracts: 
 
 
Legislation applicable to local authorities define the roles and areas of responsibility 
of each political structure, office bearer and the municipal manager133. These areas 
of responsibility and accountability for municipal managers, as indicated above, also 
reflect on the performance agreements of the institutions and the administrators 
alike. 
 
The Municipal Systems Act provides clear indications of what the contract of a 
municipal manager and managers reporting directly to it should contain134. This is in 
keeping with the spirit and intent of the Constitution135 which requires, apart from 
good governance, performance that will enhance the democratic principles, good 
service delivery, transparency in governance and public involvement136. 
 
As stated above, the functions prescribed and expectations of the performance of 
municipal managers and section 56-appointees are contained in section 57 of the 
Municipal Systems Act. They may only be appointed to those positions in terms of a 
written contract that complies with section 57, “subject to a separate performance 
agreement concluded annually…137” This performance agreement must be 
concluded within sixty days of the appointment and thereafter within one month of 
the start of each financial year. The performance agreement of the municipal 
manager must be entered into with the mayor or executive major of the municipality 
and with section 56-appointees, with the municipal manager. 
 
Whereas it is implicitly stated by the Municipal Systems Act that the employment 
contract of the municipal manager must coincide with that of the term of the council 
which means that the contract of employment will be of limited duration138. This 
132 Municipal Systems Act s57. 
133 Craythorne 119 in conjunction with s53 Municipal Systems Act. 
134 Municipal System Act s57.  
135 Constitution s41 
136 S152 
137 Municipal Systems Act s57(1)(b). 
138 S57(5). 
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condition, in terms of labour law139, may pose a problem. Where the political 
affiliation of a community remains the same, the likelihood of the re-election of 
political structures and individuals on councils is good. The administrators appointed 
by these structures may, in the absence of fair indicators to the contrary, have a 
reasonable expectation of continuation of tenure140.  This may particularly be the 
case where the incumbents have received fair or good performance reviews from 
council. One can argue that the latter may apply even if there is a material change in 
the composition of council. If an administrator has done a good job, the administrator 
may well argue that there should not be any arbitrary reasons to terminate 
employment. This becomes even more problematic if the assessment of an 
incumbent was favourable due to the incumbent’s political affiliation and not 
necessarily based on efficacy and that incumbent is then removed from position by a 
new council141. This clause may also become problematic in view of the proposed 
amendments to the BCEA and the LRA which make the conditions for appointment 
on a fixed term basis more stringent142. 
 
The term of tenure for a municipal manager may not exceed the term of the council 
by more than one year143 and must also include a provision for the termination 
thereof in the event of non-compliance with the employment contract, serious 
misconduct, or not meeting the standards set out in the performance review. It 
should also set out the process and procedure for renewal on agreement by both 
parties. In the case of Mgoqi the Executive Mayor of the City of Cape Town extended 
the contract of Mgoqi, then municipal manager, for a period of a year.  Mgoqi’s 
original contract was due to expire within days of this action. In the municipal 
elections that followed, the executive mayor was replaced by a new mayor from 
another political party. The new council set the renewal of Mgoqi’s contract aside 
based on concerns in the manner in which it was renewed. The new council held the 
opinion that the original mayor did not have the delegated power to extend the 
contract of Mgoqi. The Court held that according to the Municipal Systems Act 
139 Labour Relations Amendment Bill 2012 sections 189A, B and C – although employees earning above the threshold to be determined 
by the Minister may be excluded without detracting from the rights of these employees not to be dismissed for reasons that would be 
automatically unfair under section 187, or their rights to seek redress for unfair labour practices defined in section 186 or section 187(1)(f). 
140 LRA s186(1)(b)  
141 Mgoqi v City of Cape Town & Another [2006] 9 BLLR 873 (C); and City of Cape Town v Mgoqi and another (2006) 27 ILJ 1422 (C). 
142 LRA amendment Bill ss189(A) to (C).  
143 Craythorne 194; Municipal Systems Act 57(6)(a) – before the 2012 amendments this period was two years. 
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(before the 2012 amendments), the power to appoint a municipal manager vested in 
council and could not be delegated – the council’s system of delegations only 
provided that a mayor may appoint an acting municipal manager.  The Court rejected 
the defence of the Municipal Manager that by termination of his services the City of 
Cape Town Municipality had violated his constitutional right to fair labour practice 
and therefore had constructively dismissed him. 
  
The contract of employment of municipal managers and section 56-appointees is 
designed within the framework of the Municipal Systems Act section 57 to meet the 
needs and requirements of the individual municipalities. Emphasis may be placed on 
particular factors that were identified by council to be addressed. This is an inevitable 
result of the political nature of councils.  
 
The contract of section 56-employees is specific and specialised. However, it is 
expected of municipal managers to have more general exposure and to be able to 
exercise their duties and responsibilities in a holistic manner. 
 
In a recent advertisement for a municipal manager for the Letsement Local 
Municipality the ‘Job Description’ read as follows:  
 
(Quote) “MUNICIPAL MANAGER (Fixed-term employment contract)  
 
The incumbent will be expected to sign a five-year (5) employment and performance 
contract. 
 
Requirements: 
• A recognised Bachelor’s degree in Public Administration or Municipal 
Administration plus five years' working experience at a Senior Managerial 
level; 
• A postgraduate degree in Administration or Leadership will be an added 
advantage; 
• Excellent communication and computer skills; and 
• Driver’s licence. 
 
Key Responsibilities: 
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 • Must advise the Mayor or Council; 
• Ensure the implementation of the Council’s bylaws, policies and resolutions; 
• Ensure compliance with the Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 (Act 
no. 56 of 2003); 
• Render strategic leadership in developing, implementing and monitoring the 
Integrated Development Plan, Performance Management System and 
municipal transformation; 
• Display the highest standard of honesty, ethical and moral conduct; 
• Be accountable for organisational development, basic service delivery, local 
economic development, good governance and public participation;  
• and 
Represent the Municipality at provincial and national forums.” (unquote) 
 
The above is closely matched to the wording of the Municipal Systems Act but 
contains certain particulars that the Letsement Municipality deemed important. The 
responsibilities required from these managers are formidable144 as can be derived 
from this advertisement.   
 
3.1.1.2.2 Performance Agreements 
 
 
When performance is addressed as part of the human resources function that is 
embedded within the framework of local government legislation, pertaining to 
performance on all the aspects for which officials are held accountable in keeping 
with their Constitutional obligations, one is faced with the question of what should be 
measured and how could measurement be done in an objective manner.  
 
At the heart of performance assessment is the agreement between the employee 
and the employer. Van der Waldt also dwells on the question of measurement of 
behaviour or results of input or both145. The ideal would seem to be a system that 
would distinguish between the two aspects and include both within the measurement 
system. The measurement of behaviour can very easily become subjective whereas 
performance output is more exact and can be measured more objectively. 
144 Municipal Systems Act s55 
145 Van der Waldt et al 118. 
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 One of the main concerns attached to the system of political bodies appointing 
officials to a public position is the contention that the assessment processes may be 
coloured due to political preferences and expediencies.  
 
Van der Waldt refers to Rogers and De Bruijn146 in this regard and states that 
performance management should be regarded as an integrated set of planning and 
review procedures, which cascade down through the institution to form a link 
between individual employees and the corporate strategy. That would entail a 
greater understanding of all employees of the direction and goals of the institution 
and their role in achieving these goals.  
 
To achieve this they would require regular and pertinent feedback on their 
performance and support to improve on their weak points. “Municipal employees 
should thus fully understand what they must actually do”147. Craythorne states that 
the purpose of performance management is to establish a process whereby the 
vision and goals of the organisation can be met148.  Traditionally performance 
appraisals were done to assess the performance of an incumbent over a pre-
determined period and were deemed merely as an event; “the ‘painful’ annual 
exercise” which would be used to decide on the quantity of a bonus. This has 
changed since the 2002 legislation and the purpose was extended to include the 
identification of the quality of performance so that steps can be taken to rectify or 
terminate a poor match between job requirements and abilities149 
 
Performance appraisals assist an organisation to develop its human resources and 
fall into two classes, namely evaluative and developmental. In the evaluative 
approach past performance must be linked to future rewards in order to create 
motivation for improvement. In the developmental approach work is assessed to 
pinpoint developmental aspects to induce steps to motivate improved 
performance150. In terms of section 66 of the Municipal System Act it is the 
146 120. 
147 Ibid 120.  
148 Craythorne 200. 
149 Van der Waldt et al 120 – 121. 
150 200. 
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responsibility of the municipal manager to develop the required process, submit such 
to council for approval and ensure the effective management of such.  
 
The municipal manager is assessed by council and section 56-managers by the 
municipal manager151. The assessment through council is delegated to the executive 
mayor or the executive committee, but is based on the performance agreement of 
the incumbent municipal manager. 
 
The Local Government: Municipal Performance Regulations for Municipal Managers 
and Managers Directly Accountable to Municipal Managers, 2006, GN R805 
amended by GN 344 in GG 34213 12 April 2011, Chapter 3, section 23 – 34 
provides guidelines on this subject.  
 
The signed and accepted 2012 – 2013 Performance Agreement152, for example, 
between the municipal manager, Mr Devan Anthony and the Mkhambathini 
Municipality – represented by the mayor Ms Thobekile Ethel Maphumulo for the 
council – addresses all aspects listed in the Municipal Systems Act153  and the above 
in the following manner: 
 
• It states the terms of and the parties to the agreement. 
• The purpose of the agreement is clarified and tested against section 57(1)(b), 
(4A), (4B) and (5) of the Municipal Systems Act. 
• It specifies the objectives  and targets defined by and agreed upon between 
the municipal manager and the council “in alignment with the Integrated 
Development Plan, Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan” and 
the budget of the municipality. 
• It specifies the accountabilities of the municipal manager in accordance with 
the performance plan and agreement. 
 
151 Municipal System Act s57(2)(b) and (c). 
152 Attached as Addendum A.  
153 S55. 
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This plan contains the performance criteria and framework within which successful 
completion would be measured and the rewards in the event of “outstanding 
performance”. These are set within agreed upon time frames. 
 
The performance agreement contains two sections. The first sets out the “personal 
development” requirements of the incumbent and the second the performance 
requirements in terms of the service delivery targets and goals. This is in keeping 
with the stated principle that the performance appraisal must in the first instance not 
be punitive154 but should rather be used as a tool to identify the training and 
development needs of the incumbent.  
 
In this particular instance the generic Key Performance Areas (KPA’s) required by 
municipal managers as per the Municipal Systems Act are listed against 
predetermined weights of each of the KPA’s. The KPA’s are representative of the 
expectations of performance set out in the Municipal Systems Act and covers the 
whole ambit of responsibilities, i.e. budget, revenue, expenditure and asset 
management, supply chain management, reporting, annual financial statements and 
valuations. This part of the appraisal would weigh 80% of the total of the 
performance agreement, whereas Core Competency Requirements (CCR’s) 
pertaining to the manager’s Core Managerial Competencies (CMC’S) addressing 
strategic capability and leadership, financial management, knowledge management, 
people management and empowerment and client orientation and customer focus, 
make up the other 20% in weight155. The performance agreement requires of the 
incumbent to submit quarterly performance reports156. 
 
Performance evaluations are supposed to be as objective as possible. This alludes 
to the factual and measurable contents of the job description157 as well as to less 
tangible aspects such as attitude and behaviour of the incumbent158 – which may be 
seen differently by different observers. This has caused disputes159 in the past and 
will do so in future. 
154 Van der Waldt et al 121. 
155 See Addendum A. 
156 Addendum A clause 8 8. 
157 Addendum A Annexure A 
158 Craythorne 200. 
159 SALGBC – WCP040710, IMATU obo D du Plessis v Kannaland Municipality 2007 Ladismith, unreported. 
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 The environment within which evaluation takes place plays a significant role in the 
outcome of the evaluation. An incumbent ‘inherited’ from an earlier council with a 
significant term of employment uncompleted, or in the case of a section 56-
appointee on a permanent contract, may find itself exposed to an alien or even 
hostile evaluator as was the case with Du Plessis160. The same may also apply 
where the choice of a section 56-appointee is taken out of the hands of a municipal 
manager. This may happen where the tenure of a municipal manager has not 
expired but the composition of council has changed and the council makes a section 
56-appointment despite the municipal manager’s input to the contrary, or the other 
way round161. 
 
3.2 Responsibility and Accountability towards Council 
 
It is required of senior management of municipalities and more particularly the 
municipal manager to advise the political structure of municipalities on certain 
matters162. These matters pertain to a number of aspects but will differ from 
municipality to municipality. It is required of the councils to oversee proper 
management and involvement in and transparency to the communities involved in 
the demarcated area of the municipality163. This also involves the IDP which should 
be developed by the municipal manager with the input of section 56-appointees and 
which must be submitted to the council for approval and acceptance164. Apart from 
that, the municipal manager must submit regular reports on the implementation of 
the IDP and he will be appraised by the council in his performance assessment on 
this issue, apart from his general performance as chief executive officer of the 
municipality. In his turn the municipal manager will assess managers reporting 
directly to him on their performance relating to the IDP and input required of them 
toward the council. 
 
160 Ibid. 
161 Lourens and IMATU obo Jordaan v Oudtshoorn Municipality  
162 Municipal Systems Act s55(1)(i). 
163 Constitution s152; Municipal Structures Act s19  
164 Municipal System Act Chapter 5 ss23, 25 – 30 and s55(c) 
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The municipal manager with the resources available to his office needs to advice the 
municipal council on legal matters, technical issues and specialised services that are 
not within the knowledge of laity165.   
 
The relationship between a municipal manager and those managers directly 
responsible to the municipal manager is always prone to the political pressures and 
expectations from council members and the council as a body.  
 
Ideally this would ensure high quality service delivery on an equal basis to all 
residents within the demarcated area of the municipality but might also result in 
politically expedient demands and the typical fallout due to antagonism, lack of, or 
divided, team loyalties.   
 
3.3 Involving the Community 
 
Local authorities are there for the people and to serve the people to the best interest 
of the people, the so-called Batho Pele principle.  
 
The ethos required by the Constitution166 goes even wider than this and requires 
participation from the community in municipal affairs167. Looking at the principles 
involved in local governance and the fact that local authorities are the government 
structures closest to the community, this becomes self-evident. 
 
It is however required that the involvement is initiated by the municipality and that 
responsibility rests on the shoulders of the municipal manager, who has to report on 
this to the council.  
 
Although the interaction is not specified in detail, the municipal manager has to 
submit action plans in this regard to the council168. Broad outlines are however 
provided. A municipality is required to develop a culture of municipal governance 
“that complements formal representative government with a system of participatory 
165 S55(i) 
166 Constitution s152. 
167 S152(1)(e). 
168 Addendum A item 8 8. 
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governance169”, provided that the provisions for such participation do not interfere 
with the municipality’s rights and obligations to govern and exercise its legislative 
authority. Community participation should take place through the political structures 
as provided for in the Constitution and made effective through the Municipal 
Structures Act and the Municipal Systems Act170 delegated to municipal 
management. Such successful interaction will inevitably result in nurturing affinity for 
the political structure in municipalities. 
 
3.4 Representing the Municipality 
 
The mayor or executive mayor, together with the municipal manager, is the official 
faces of the municipality, the mayor as the political leader and the municipal 
manager as the chief executive officer of the municipality as an institution.  
 
Although the mayor will be answerable to his constituents for poor service delivery, 
the municipal manager’s career depends on good management and the proper 
utilisation of all the resources available to the municipality.  
 
3.5 Summary 
 
The municipal manager and managers reporting directly to the municipal manager 
are senior officials with a formidable job description with stringent performance 
requirements attached.  
 
The Municipal Systems Act requires that adequately qualified persons be appointed 
in these positions. Municipal managers are appointed on limited duration contracts 
that coincide with the terms of the municipal councils and may not exceed that term 
by 12 months. The amended Local Government: Municipal Systems Act does not 
explicitly require that managers reported directly to the municipal manager should 
also be appointed on limited duration contracts. The political nature of the 
appointment of municipal managers coupled with the limited duration of such 
appointment is not conducive to career building in municipal management and often 
169 Craythorne 313. 
170 Municipal Systems Act s59. 
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result in transient involvement with the exceedingly important task of provision of 
efficient service delivery at local government level.  
 
Municipal managers are appointed by the council and managers reporting directly to 
the municipal manager by council in consultation with the municipal manager. Senior 
managers in municipal employ may not hold active political office whilst employed. 
 
Although job descriptions and performance requirements may differ from municipality 
to municipality in some detail, the Municipal Systems Act together with the Municipal 
Structures and Financial Structures Act prescribe to a large extent what the contracts 
and performance agreements of senior municipal managers should contain. The 
standard of performance, resulting in service delivery, is derived from the 
Constitution. 
 
Performance agreements are the yardstick by which senior municipal managers are 
measured. In the case of the municipal manager, the measurement takes place 
through the council and in the case of section 56-appointees through the municipal 
manager. Although the criteria for measurement are well established and agreed 
upon, political influences and personal perceptions may still play a role and may 
adversely affect an evaluation due to certain aspects that cannot be measured 
objectively and may be subject to personal interpretations and circumstances.  
 
Senior municipal officials receive their delegated duties through legislation. In terms 
of this legislation they have to function efficiently on both the administrative level 
where services must be provided to the communities they serve; on the internal 
administrative level to ensure the optimum deployment of personnel and on the level 
where technical advice is required by the political structures. The efficacy of their 
performance, in the case of the municipal manager, is measured through the elected 
political structure which consists in most instances of lay people which may be 
coloured by personal agendas. 
 
The municipal manager is the face of the municipality and is required to represent 
the municipality as an organisation. 
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4 Chapter 4 
 
4.1 Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution 
 
Municipalities have their individual disciplinary codes and procedures. These 
however are based on the prescripts provided by the SALGBC, and SALGA as a 
party to the bargaining council. At the time of this treatise, a dispute existed about 
the main collective agreement at SALGBC which inter alia affects the municipal 
disciplinary agreement. 
 
The municipal manager is responsible and accountable for effective management 
and application of the municipality’s disciplinary procedure. A typical municipal 
disciplinary procedure would be implemented after consultation with the unions 
involved and makes provision for categories of misconduct and guidelines to deal 
with such171. Guidelines provided by SALGA and contained in the disciplinary codes 
and procedures of individual municipalities, provide for a degree of tolerance which 
under normal circumstances should be applicable for these types of contraventions.  
 
The SALGBC Disciplinary Code provides guidelines on procedure and level of 
application of discipline. In the event of misconduct occurring, the misconduct has to 
be referred to the municipal manager or his or her authorised representative.  This is 
in keeping with the stipulations of the Municipal Systems Act which makes the 
municipal manager responsible and accountable for the maintenance of discipline of 
staff172.   
 
The codes and procedures are also prescriptive about representation, the chairing of 
disciplinary inquiries as well as conduct of the role players at the inquiries, the types 
of sanction that may be meted out and general prescriptions as to what could be 
acceptable and what not. 
 
The managers reporting directly to the municipal manager are subject to this code 
and procedure as well as to the Regulations applicable to senior management in 
171 Municipal Systems Act s67.  
172 s55(1)(g). 
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Municipalities – see footnote 180. These managers are often members of the trade 
unions party to the SALGBC Main Agreement and may be represented by officials of 
the unions173. In this instance the employee, Du Plessis, was the Director Technical 
Services of the Kannaland Municipality and had a dispute with the municipality about 
an assessment in terms of his performance agreement.  
 
Disciplinary measures are further regulated in GN 344, published in GG 34213 of 21 
April 2011. It provides disciplinary regulations for senior managers. Section 2 of 
chapter 2 makes provision for disciplinary codes and procedures applicable to “all 
municipalities” and “senior managers”. 
 
Disputes emanating from the process may be referred for adjudication through the 
structures provided for by the LRA and in this particular instance by the SALGBC 
Dispute Resolution Unit in as far as employees of a municipality is concerned but 
senior managers have access in terms GN 344 to the CCMA and other applicable 
accredited agencies.  Certain matters are excluded from the jurisdiction of the 
bargaining councils and the SALGBC dispute resolution system, such as any dispute 
about the interpretation of terms or conditions of the SALGBC Main Agreement and 
matters that have been ruled out of jurisdiction through court precedent. By 
agreement the senior managers and municipality can accordingly choose to refer 
disputes for private arbitration as well. 
 
4.2 The legal framework 
 
Once a matter has been referred as a dispute to the SALGBC or other accredited 
body, it is subject to the same process as provided for through the auspices of the 
Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration. 
 
The LRA makes provision for a bargaining council that is suitably accredited to fulfil 
similar functions to that of the CCMA excluding those referred to above (see footnote 
169). In the matter Du Plessis v Kannaland Municipality, the arbitrator found that the 
SALGBC had no jurisdiction to arbitrate on a matter referred to as an unfair labour 
173 IMATU obo D du Plessis v Kannaland Municipality. 
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practice that had to do with remuneration as opposed to benefits. A fair number of 
similar matters served before the SALGBC in this regard and had a direct bearing on 
the performance agreements between senior managers and the municipality.  
 
The disciplinary regulations for Senior Managers contained in the Government 
Gazette, No 34213, Notice 344: Local Government, 21 April 2011, apply to all senior 
managers of a municipality. 
 
The performance agreement of a municipal manager encloses a Code of Conduct. In 
the Code of Conduct of the Mkhambathini municipality174, for example, the code 
contains in clause 14A(1) disciplinary steps that can be instituted in the event of non-
compliance with the code for various reasons in accordance with this section. In the 
Local Government: Municipal Performance Regulations for Municipal Managers and 
Managers Directly Accountable to Municipal Managers, section 33 makes provision 
for the referral of disputes about aspects pertaining to the performance agreement to 
the MEC for local government, in the case of the municipal manager, within 30 days 
of receipt of a formal dispute, and in the case of section 56-managers to the 
executive mayor or mayor within the same window period175. 
 
4.2.1 Internal mechanisms for municipal discipline 
 
 
The disciplinary code and procedure at a municipality is thus applicable to all 
employees of the municipality. 
 
In most instances the parties to the SALGBC act for and on behalf of their members 
in the disciplinary processes. In many instances however, senior managers avail 
themselves of the services of legal representatives. The technical complexity of 
matters and the issues that need to be addressed, the public interest and impact of 
the matters also play a role and determine whether a senior manager will make use 
of his union or rather of a legal practitioner176. It is conceivable that in future senior 
municipal managers may only have access to the Labour Court in the event of a 
174 Addendum A, Appendix B, Schedule 2, item 14A(1). 
175 Municipal Systems Act & Reg GN 344 in GG 34213 reg 33(1)(a) and (b). 
176 SALGBC Arbitration Case WCP091001 3 May 2011. 
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perceived unfair dismissal or unfair labour practice depending on their income 
level177. This will also depend on what basis managers reporting directly to the 
municipal manager are appointed. From current legislation (Municipal System Act 
section 56) it seems that the option to appoint on a permanent basis is that of the 
particular municipal council in consultation with the municipal manager – subsections 
(1) and (7). This will, no doubt, soon be tested in litigation. 
 
Schedule 2: Code of Conduct for Municipal Staff Members contained in the 
Municipal Systems Act, referred to by section 69, deals with general conduct issues 
as well as the commitment expected of a staff member of a municipality when 
“serving the public interest. This applies to all employees of a municipality and 
regulates conduct on a wide variety of aspects pertaining to public service and 
administration, inclusive of but not restricted to obtaining personal gain except 
remuneration from his or her position; the disclosure of benefits that might be derived 
from service or contracts with or through the municipality; unauthorised disclosure of 
information; receipt of gifts and favours emanating from the incumbent’s position as 
an employee of the municipality; usage of municipal property; sexual harassment 
and the duty to disclose misconduct. Failure to comply with this schedule will be 
dealt with in accordance with the disciplinary code and procedure of the 
municipality178. Finally, should an employee allow him or herself to be influenced to 
act contrary to the Code or to be corrupted in any manner to enforce or fail to 
enforce any code, decision or by-law of the municipality in an improper manner, such 
an employee will be subjected to disciplinary, legal and or any applicable punitive 
steps179. 
 
The Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers No 344 
applicable to the senior management of municipalities, state as principles that 
discipline for these employees is “fundamentally a corrective measure” and that it 
must be applied timeously, fairly, consistently and in a progressive manner180. 
 
177 LRA Amendment Bill 2012 s188B. 
178 Craythorne 218. 
179 Municipal Systems Act s119. 
180 Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers, 2010 Government Gazette 34213 Notice No 344 21 April 2011, 
regulation 3. 
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The Regulations require of the municipal council to institute disciplinary proceedings 
against these employees181 in accordance with the principles and procedures 
prescribed in the Regulations and schedule 2 of the Municipal Systems Act. The 
procedure to be followed by council is set-out in item 5 which states in regulation 
5(2) that an allegation against a senior member of municipal management has to be 
submitted to the mayor “or the municipal manager”, in the event of the allegation 
being made against a section 56-appointee. It further requires the council to appoint 
an independent investigator, regulation 5(3) to investigate the matter if there is a 
reasonable cause to believe that misconduct has been committed by the senior 
manager and that a report must be submitted to the mayor or the municipal manager 
within 30 days of the appointment to investigate. In terms of regulation 5(6) the 
municipal council must by way of a council resolution institute disciplinary action 
against the senior manager which must also indicate the seriousness of the alleged 
misconduct and authorisation to the mayor or the municipal manager (within context) 
to appoint an independent external presiding officer and an officer to lead the 
evidence182. 
 
The Regulations make provision for precautionary suspension183. This precautionary 
suspension has been the cause for various applications for interdicts against 
employers in this industry. In the matter Biyase v Sisonke District Municipality and 
another184, presiding Judge Steenkamp remarked “This urgent application arises, 
like so many others before this Court, from the suspension of a senior manager by a 
municipality.” He further states that the Regulations “…impose obligations on 
municipalities with regard to procedural steps in disciplinary proceedings that are far 
more stringent than those imposed by the Labour Relations Act – and arguably 
unnecessary and out of line with the objectives of the LRA.” He concluded, that 
despite the fact that these impositions are out of line with the objectives of the LRA, 
they unfortunately remain binding on municipalities.  
 
Biyase was the Executive Director: Corporate Services of the Sisonke District 
Municipality. He was informed by the municipality that the municipality intended to 
181 Reg 4(1) 
182 Reg 5(6) and (7). 
183 Reg 6. 
184 Biyase v Sisonke District Municipality and Another (D 999/11 [2011] ZALCD 9 (28 November 2011) (Saflii). 
53 
 
                                            
suspend him “pending the finalisation of the investigation” purported to be for gross 
misconduct.  
 
Van Niekerk J argued in his finding on the matter that the Regulations prescribe an 
“elaborate” procedure centred on regulation 6(2) which allows for the manager to 
make a written representation, before being suspended and within seven days of 
being notified of the council’s decision to suspend, why the suspension should not be 
imposed.  This, Judge van Niekerk, argued, contained an inherent contradiction in 
that the council must give the manager an opportunity to make representation before 
the suspension but is required to do so within seven days of the council decision to 
suspend185. 
 
From this finding and judgement as well as that in Ralekgetho Lebu v Maquassi Hills 
Local Authority and others186, the principle was stressed that the employee has a 
clear contractual right in terms of the Regulations and should be afforded the 
opportunity to rely on such.  
 
The Regulations provide in regulation 8 the steps required at the inquiry of a senior 
manager on allegations of serious misconduct. The rights of such an employee is 
highlighted in this regulation which, inter alia makes provision for representation of 
the incumbent’s choice “who may be a fellow staff member, shop steward, union 
official or any other suitably qualified person”. Where a senior manager is accused of 
a financial infraction which constitutes a criminal offence the mayor or the municipal 
manager (within context) is obliged to report the matter to the South African Police in 
keeping with the requirements of the Local Government: Municipal Finance 
Management Act 56 of 2003187. 
 
The Regulations make further provision for the conducting of the disciplinary inquiry 
and sanctions applicable to the misconduct in regulations 10 and 12. Regulation 12 
provides for punitive suspension in 12(1)(a); demotion, transfer to another position; 
reduction in salary, allowances or other benefits; an appropriate fine or dismissal.  
185 Biyase ad Saflii paragraph 13, re reg 5(a). 
186 Ralekgetho Lebu v Maquassi Hills Local Authority and others (J 2695/11) unpublished  
187 Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers, reg 8(4). 
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 The Regulations do not provide for a grievance procedure. Issues resulting in formal 
grievances are dealt with within the performance agreement. In the attached 
performance agreement, Addendum A item 12 under “Dispute Resolution” and the 
steps available to the incumbent is set out therein. 
 
The Regulations do not only make provision for misconduct, but also for poor or 
substandard performance. Substandard performance is defined in chapter 1 as “poor 
work or unacceptable performance or failing to meet the required standard set for the 
post”. Chapter 3 of the Regulations deals with substandard performance by senior 
municipal managers as required by the Municipal Performance regulations item 32 in 
the Municipal Systems Act and is augmented by Schedule 8 of the LRA. 
 
In item 32(1) it is stated that performance will be evaluated to form the basis for 
rewarding outstanding performance or correcting unacceptable performance. 
Regulation 15 set the applicable policy and principles a “municipality” must adhere to 
in the process whereas procedure 16 set the procedures to be followed. The 
appointed agents for the municipality in this regard are the mayor in the case of the 
municipal manager and the municipal manager in the case of a section 56-
appointee. A fair amount of tolerance is provided for to deal with poor performance 
but if it proves that the poor performance persist regulations 16(5) and (6) provide for 
the mechanism to address the issue in disciplinary proceedings in terms of 
regulation 8, which provides for gross misconduct. 
 
In many instances the evaluation processes still cause concerns since the evaluators 
may, by virtue of the reason for their existence, place political imperatives before 
objective criteria. Being aware of this it is only to be expected that an incumbent 
senior manager may rather dance to the tune the piper play than to do the proper 
things that might not be politically popular. Councils are transitory of nature and the 
fact that they wish to impact as much as possible during their tenure tend to 
aggravate the situation. Furthermore, the ability to properly assess the performance 
of highly technical officials by lay-people poses a problem since the ability to assess 
properly might well be lacking.   
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4.2.2 External Dispute Resolution 
 
In terms of section 23(1) of the Constitution and as provided for through South 
African labour legislation, all employees have the right to fair labour practices which 
entails the right to fairness in dealing with labour disputes and matters related to 
disciplinary action. 
 
When an employee is found guilty of misconduct, the act of misconduct constitutes 
an infringement of the contractual relationship between the employer and the 
employee and may result in dismissal188. Once dismissal has taken place the 
employer – employee relationship ceases to exist. Labour legislation deals with the 
relationship between an employer and the employee which is in essence a common 
law relationship.  
 
Legislation does not define what exactly constitutes misconduct and when 
misconduct is serious enough to warrant the repudiation of the employment 
relationship. Schedule 8 of the LRA, Code of Good Practice: Dismissal provides 
some guidelines in item 3(4) and relates to serious insubordination, serious or gross 
dishonesty, wilfully endangering of the safety of others, physical assault of the 
employer, colleagues or third parties in the workplace. A number of other issues can 
be added which, within context, can be deemed on merit to be serious misconduct or 
when occurring repeatedly constitutes sufficient reason to terminate the employment 
contract189.  
 
The section above dealt with the process and procedures required to institute fair 
practices in dealing with the application of discipline. Van Niekerk J stated in Biyase 
that the Regulations applicable to senior management in municipalities are more 
onerous than contemplated by the legislator when labour legislation was developed 
for the post-apartheid South African labour market. In the preamble to the LRA it is 
stated that the Act is developed to “…provide simple procedures for the resolution of 
labour disputes through statutory conciliation, mediation and arbitration...” 
 
188 Craythorne 373 -374. 
189 LRA Sch 8 and Craythorne 374. 
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As far as the requirements of the LRA go as stated in Schedule 8 – which consists of 
guidelines and not legislation – there must be disciplinary rules which state clear and 
unambiguous standards of conduct required in the workplace; there should be 
informal procedures for dealing with minor violations of workplace discipline; 
generally disciplinary measures should be applied progressively; other remedies 
should be considered before dismissal takes place; rules against which conduct is 
measured should be fair, valid, known, applicable and practicable190.    
 
The employer however has the right to terminate an employment contract if a 
material breach in that contract occurred due to the behaviour of the employee and 
when the trust relationship has been destroyed in the process.  
 
A senior manager, like all employees, has the right to dispute the fairness of such a 
decision by an employer. The Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior 
Managers provide for this right in regulation 13. The SALGBC is an accredited body 
to deal with labour disputes emanating from municipalities. Regulation 13 provides 
for the opportunity of senior managers to refer disputes “against any disciplinary 
finding and / or sanction imposed on him or her at a disciplinary hearing to the 
Bargaining Council, Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration or an 
accredited agency” in terms of section 133 of the LRA. The amendments to the LRA 
may alter this situation in that the earnings threshold to be determined by the 
minister may impose on these rights. 
 
In the matter between Godfrey Louw and George Municipality, Louw – at the time of 
the dispute municipal manager – the SALGBC was chosen as the forum through 
which remedy was pursued. The arbitrator in this instance found that Louw was 
indeed guilty of misconduct but not to the extent that his contract of service should 
have been terminated. Apart from applying insights gained from the Sidumo 
Constitutional Court ruling191, the arbitrator also referred with concern to the political 
190 Craythorne 374. 
191 Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others (CCT 85/06) [2007] ZACC 22; [2007] 
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undertones present in the “prosecution” of Louw192. Political undertones are present 
in quite a number of cases referred for resolution and even to the courts193.  
 
Senior municipal managers, and for that matter the municipalities, may apply for the 
review of matters dealt with in arbitration in terms of section 145 of the LRA. 
 
A spate of labour disputes by senior municipal officials and public servants were 
referred as a result of a lack of clarity to the High Court for adjudication. The debate 
about this aspect and the jurisdictional issues involved will be discussed below but 
was summarised in the SCA matter between Mputumi Camaron Manana versus the 
King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality194. 
 
Although the LC is deemed to have exclusive jurisdiction in “...respect of all matters 
that elsewhere in terms of (the LRA) are to be determined by the Labour Court”, it 
has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court (HC) in respect of an “...alleged or 
threatened violation of a fundamental right entrenched in Chapter 2” of the 
Constitution arising from employment and labour relations and disputes over the 
constitutionality of executive or administrative actions or conduct by the State in its 
capacity as employer and the “...application of any law for the administration of which 
the Minister is responsible”195.  
 
Bosch et al states, somewhat simplistically, that the Labour Court has jurisdiction 
when four elements are present, i.e. territory (referring to the province in which the 
matter has to be dealt with); the person of the referring party and the respondent 
(usually involving who is at the time an employee or employer); the cause or matter 
in dispute and the time (it has only jurisdiction on matters referred to it after it came 
into operation)196.  
 
192 SALGBC case WCP091001 3 May 2011. 
193 See for instances Ngqele v King Sabatha Dalindyebo Municipality & others ([2011] 8 BLLR 817; (ECM)) [2011] ZAECMHC 2; 2607/10 
(17 February 2011), Lottering & others v Stellenbosch Municipality (159/2010) [2010] ZALC 67; [2010] 12 BLLR 1306 (LC); 2010 31 ILJ 
2923 (LC) (7 May 2010) and City of Cape Town v Mgoqi and another [2006] 9 BLLR 873 (C). 
194 Manana v King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality (345/09) [2010] ZASCA 144 (25 November 2010) ad par 2. 
195 LRA ss157(1) and (2) 
196 Bosch, Molahlehi, Everett The Conciliation and Arbitration Handbook Lexis Nexis Durban 2004 303. 
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Du Toit et al197 states that the concurrent jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the 
High Court is limited to rights in terms of chapter two of the Constitution other than 
those contemplated in terms of s23(1).  
 
Confusion arising from the somewhat ambiguous wording of the LRA has been 
addressed in the courts198. In the case of Makhanya v University of Zululand199 the 
Court held that there should be a distinction between claims for the enforcement of 
employment contracts and claims for unfair dismissal disputes. In terms of this 
decision, nothing precludes a dismissed employee from suing simultaneous for 
breach of contract in a civil court and claiming restitution for unfair dismissal through 
the LRA200.  
 
The contracts of employment of municipal managers, and still in many instances 
those of managers reporting directly to the municipal manager, are fixed term 
contracts subject to the common law approach to contracts and contractual law. With 
reference to Chirwa and Gcaba201, relating to a dispute of promotion, Hoexter202 
discusses the approach of the CC regarding the conundrum of simultaneously 
available rights. The CC in Gcaba confirmed the interdependence and inseparability 
of human rights and that “…conduct in the workplace may give rise to a variety of 
different claims.” 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) seems to have developed the common law 
approach finding that every contract of employment contains an implied term that an 
employee may not be dismissed unfairly which raises the question whether the 
dispute resolution process as contemplated by the LRA has become superfluous. 
Grogan203 poses the question whether this approach would not expose employers to 
multiple claims or to the so called ‘double dipping processes’.  
197 Du Toit, Bosch, Woolfrey, Godfrey, Cooper, Giles, Bosch, Rossouw Labour Relations Law 5th Edition  Lexis Nexis Butterworths Durban 
2006 154. 
198 Denel Informatics Staff Association & another v Denel Informatics (Pty) Ltd  [1998] BLLR 1014 (LC); Vukaphi v Mayor of Lusikisiki 
Transitional Local Council [1998] 7 BLLR 787 (Tk); Fredericks v MEC for Education and Training, Eastern Cape [2002] 2 BLLR 119 (CC); 
Chirwa v Transnet Ltd & others (2008) 29 ILJ 73 (CC); Tsika v Buffalo City Municipality (151/07) [2008] ZAECHC 199; [2009] 3 BLLR 272. 
199 Makhanya v University of Zululand (2009) 30 ILJ 1539 (SCA).  
200 Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi (2007) 28 ILJ 1499 (SCA), Boxer Superstores Mthatha & another v Mbenya (2007) 28 
ILJ 2209 (SCA) and Murray v Minister of Defence (2008) 29 ILJ 1369 (SCA) 
201 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC). 
202 Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2nd Ed) 2012 Juta Cape Town 214. 
203 Grogan Juta’s Annual Labour Law updates 2010 Juta & Co Cape Town 2. 
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 The SCA approached the matter differently in SA Maritime Safety Authority v 
McKenzie204. In this matter the SCA considered the nature of the claim rather than 
the origin and based its findings on that. Where the contract of employment or a term 
thereof as a contract is in dispute the matter should be dealt with by the high courts 
as a contractual issue regardless of whether it is an employment contract, whereas 
where issues pertaining to unfair labour practices, including unfair dismissals are the 
focal point, the LRA applies205 as the LRA is the sole source of remedies for such.  
 
Public-sector employment relationships have caused a fair amount of uncertainty 
and, as stated above have been the source of much debate.  
 
The one approach206 relies on the premise that any type of employment relationship 
should be governed by the section 23 of the Constitution and the associated 
legislation and that it should exclude section 33, which deals with administrative 
action, and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). It needs to 
be noted that in an earlier case, Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile207 and related 
matters in the pre-democratic era, an opposing view was held but is now deemed to 
be no longer effective. This leads Hoexter to conclude that there is no longer a need 
to use administrative law to advance labour rights. 
 
The other approach208 favours the view that the exercise of public powers would 
inevitably involve the protection provided by administrative as well as labour law209, 
regardless of the background. According to this approach remedies are available in 
both the labour law and administrative law context. Hoexter adds that the definition 
of administrative action in this context is to a large extent dependent on the 
requirement of public power in the relationship.  
204 SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie (2010) 31 ILJ 529 (SCA). 
205 Grogan 2. 
206 South African Police Union v National Commissioner of the South African Police Service (2005) 26 ILJ 2403 (LC). In this matter the 
right of the Commissioner of Police to introduce a new shift system was disputed. See also paragraph 52.  
207 Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile 191 (1) SA 21 (A); Administrator, Natal v Sibiya 1992 (4) SA 532 (A); Foster v Chairman, 
Commissioner for Administration 1991 (4) SA 403 (C); Bula v Minister of Education 1992 (4)SA 716 (Tk) and Hlongwa v Minister of 
Justice, KwaZulu-Natal 1993 (2) SA 269) (D). 
208 Police and Prison Civil Rights Union v Minister of Correctional Services (No 1) 2008 (3) SA 91 (E). A number of employees were 
dismissed due to refusal to work. Plasket J found that the power to dismiss had been vested in a public functionary required to exercise 
such power in the public interest. 
209 Hoexter 210 - 211. 
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 The argument of Plasket J on this relates to the premise that public entities are 
established in terms of the Constitution which bestow on such entities responsibilities 
and accountabilities to fulfil the intent of the Constitution. This would then include 
Municipalities and senior managers of municipalities. Plasket J further argues “there 
is nothing incongruous about individuals having more legal protection rather than 
less, or of more than one fundamental right applying to one act, or more than one 
branch of law applying to the same set of facts210”. 
 
In Chirwa the CC held that the dismissal of Chirwa was a matter that had to be dealt 
with by labour law and that the LC has exclusive jurisdiction on such matters. 
Chirwa, being a public sector employee would otherwise have had – like all 
employees in the public sector – an unfair advantage over those in the private 
sector. It would also address the issue of undesirable “forum-shopping”211. 
 
Although the LRA creates the framework to give effect to the constitutional right that 
a contract of employment may not to be repudiated unfairly, the LRA only refers to 
contracts of employment in Section 23(3) in the context of the status of such in terms 
of a collective agreement binding on both the employer and the employee. The 
BCEA212 states that basic conditions of employment form terms of employment 
contracts determining the minimum by law acceptable terms and does not preclude 
better or more advantageous terms and conditions.  
 
Grogan argues that in this manner terms are implied into the provisions of contracts 
by operation of law213. The LRA relating to unfair dismissal contains no such express 
provision. He adds “If (the employee) contended the entire statutory scheme was 
impliedly incorporated into his contract, nothing would be added to the rights he 
enjoyed under the LRA, and incorporation would be pointless. Since the LRA gives 
expression to a constitutional right, courts should be astute to prevent attempts to 
dilute or extend that right by implied contractual terms.”   
 
210 Police and Prison Civil Rights Union v Minister of Correctional Services (No 1) 2008 (3) SA 91 (E) ad paragraph 61. 
211 Hoexter 212. 
212 Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1977. 
213 Juta’s Labour Law 2010 2-3. 
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The above give credence to Du Toit et al arguing that the LRA confers exclusive 
jurisdiction in terms of labour rights214.  
 
In terms of this approach, a party to a dispute referred to a bargaining council215 or 
the CCMA216 has recourse to the Labour Court in the event of dissatisfaction with the 
outcome of processes before the council or the CCMA as provided for in the LRA217 
since that is the appointed court to deal with matters pertaining to labour rights. 
Despite misgivings on various aspects of the reasoning and approach by the CC218 
in Gcaba the Court indeed confirmed that the problems of parallel systems of law, 
duplication of jurisdiction and forum-shopping would be reduced by this approach, 
i.e. that labour related conduct by public officials does not constitute administrative 
action and should be dealt with within the exclusive ambit of labour law.  
 
A dispute about an unfair labour practice – or as they normally originate, a grievance 
– has been dealt with in the Supreme Court of Appeal in Manana (see footnote 193). 
The King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality failed to remunerate Manana in terms of a 
resolution adopted by the Municipal Council on 3 November 2006 which appointed 
him as the Manager Legal Services effective 10 August 2001 and which instructed 
the municipality to make the remuneration on a grade three level retrospective from 
August 2006. This was accepted in writing by Manana. A contract thus existed. 
 
In Manana a number of important aspects were addressed.  
 
Firstly Nugent JA dealt with the delegation of powers and the role of the municipal 
manager versus that of the council. In paragraph 16 of the ruling, Nugent states: “A 
municipal council is not capable in practice of exercising its executive authority by 
running the day-to-day affairs of the municipality and employs staff to do that on its 
behalf. In the past it was common for municipal councils to confer the appropriate 
authority upon their staff by delegation of all or some of its executive powers. Such a 
delegation of power does not ordinarily divest the delegator of the power to perform 
214 Du Toit 155. 
215 LRA ss27-34. 
216 Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, established in terms of LRA ss112-126. 
217 S145. 
218 Hoexter 214 – 218. 
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the particular function itself… In my view section 55(1)219 is no more than a statutory 
means of conferring such power upon municipal managers to attend to the affairs of 
the municipality… There is no basis for construing the section as simultaneously 
divesting the municipal council of any of its executive powers220.”  
 
Secondly, it confirms the role of council as the employer: “the Constitution vests all 
executive authority – which includes the authority to appoint staff – in the municipal 
council and legislation is not capable of lawfully divesting it of that power.” It follows 
that the appointment of Manana by the King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipal Council 
could not be ignored or altered by the Director Corporate Services or the Municipal 
Manager for that matter.  
 
Reference is further made to Gcaba and the role of the high court to rule on such a 
matter. Nugent JA referred to the fact that the high court had declined jurisdiction on 
the matter. He states “The evidence in this case establishes the existence of a 
contract of employment between the municipality and Mr Manana and he wishes to 
enforce the contract. It is conceded that the high court had jurisdiction to do so, 
which it clearly does. That he might have been entitled to other relief under the 
remedies provided for under the Labour relations act does not somehow extinguish 
his contractual rights221.” This is in line with McKenzie222. 
 
4.3 Conclusion: 
 
Local government institutions are well regulated in terms of their conduct and 
required performance in keeping with the Constitution section 195. This conduct and 
performance criteria are contained in local authority legislation, codes and 
regulations that also provide for process and procedure in the event of a deviation 
from such. 
 
The agents of the local government institutions to manage these regulations and 
codes are the elected councils through their mayors and the municipal managers on 
219 Municipal Systems Act. 
220 Manana par 16 and 17. 
221 Gcaba par 23. 
222 SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie (2010) 31 ILJ 529 (SCA). 
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the mandate of the council when managers reporting directly to the municipal 
manager are involved.  
 
The criteria for selection and appointment of municipal managers and managers 
reporting directly to them are well described and their appointments are subject to 
the agreement and signing of performance agreements applicable to their positions. 
These agreements contain dispute resolution clauses augmented by Local 
Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers, the particular 
municipality disciplinary code and procedure as well as guidelines provided by 
SALGA. All these are regulated through section 69 of the Municipal Systems Act as 
well as the Performance Regulations. These deal with misconduct as well as poor 
performance issues. 
 
Senior managers have the right to refer disputes arising from the internal procedures 
and processes to the SALGBC dispute resolution unit, the CCMA and other 
accredited organisations. Amendments to labour legislation may in future impede on 
these rights due to the income threshold to be determined by the Minister of Labour. 
 
A fair amount of uncertainty and debate evolved about the course a dispute might 
take after the internal process. Recent Constitutional Court judgements have 
provided more defined guidelines even though some are questioned by practitioners 
in the labour law and administrative law fraternities. Chirwa followed by Gcaba 
determined that matters pertaining to employment matters should be dealt with 
within the framework provided by the labour laws and not administrative laws and 
through the Labour Court system. 
 
In instances of record actions taken against officials were based on political agendas 
and expediencies and matters thus arising have been referred to the courts resulting 
in costly and lengthy legal disputes. Inevitably the institutions suffered the financial 
as well as service delivery consequences.  
 
A municipal manager’s appointment is linked to that of council and the possibility that 
the manager may not be appointed by a council with another composition was 
64 
 
proven slim in the past, impacting negatively on career building and continuity in 
management practices.  
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5 Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion: 
 
The Local government system is still subject to the development of its role in the 
governance structure. Since 1995 local government in South Africa has for the first 
time in history been afforded a special status and asserted a distinct sphere of 
government where it is no longer a function of a national or provincial department. It 
is however still subject to the intervention of the Member of the Executive Committee 
of the Province, in which it is situated, should the need arise. In many instances this 
proved to be necessary due to the inability of a particular municipality to exercise its 
functions properly.  
 
Like many public entities, municipalities and their senior officials – both politically 
elected and appointed by the politically elected bodies – have succumbed to the 
scourge of corruption as can be attested by almost daily reports. 
 
Corruption has been with us for centuries already. Craythorne refers to a quote of 
Edward Gibbon223 made in his autobiography, which reads “Corruption, the most 
infallible symptom of constitutional liberty”224. The tendency exists to treat corruption 
in terms of legal terms whereas it in reality proves to be a moral and ethical issue at 
heart.   
 
There is however no doubt that corruption manifests in illegalities, dishonesty and 
acts of dishonesty – bribes and stealing public property, enriching oneself at the cost 
of others. The dictionary meaning of the verb goes further than that and refers to 
aspects like tainting, destroying the purity of, debase and prevent, spoil and bribe. 
The adjective means morally depraved and wicked. These are strong words to use in 
this context but corruption has become a constant reference in the South African 
public services domain. Craythorne points out that the old adage is still true – power 
corrupts. Political power is no exception. The worse is that political power can 
corrupt without the commission of any illegal act or giving rise to an indictable 
223 Edward Gibbon (1737 – 1794). 
224 Craythorne 310. 
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offence. The corrupt mind in this sense is convinced of its superiority and that the 
consideration of other people is not necessary. The holding of political power has 
become a right and the opinions of the person infallible, resulting in moral 
degradation. 
 
In this regard Craythorne refers to the degree of conformity to ideas, practices, public 
positions and declarations – moral principles. This eventually extends to the erosion 
of legitimacy, the distortion of decisions by persons with the right contacts or in the 
right positions in the public arena, the compelling of insubordinates to slavishly obey 
orders and or instructions to suit the view or purposes of the corruptor. The former 
Minister for Provincial and Local Government225 stated “The obligations of public 
office need honest and ingenuous accounting, but also require a commitment to 
democratic process. We who are entrusted with this privilege, should process a 
strong sense of responsibility to act with efficiency and competence, and, to 
discipline personal desires to the standards of law and democratic expectations. We 
have a duty to frame judgements within the context of our constitutional values, yet 
shape them in response to legitimate public demands. We have further obligation 
(sic) to seek outcomes that are respectful of the public, within the demands of law, 
particularly since we are trustees of the public good in an environment dominated by 
private interests. As custodians of public institutions, we should attend to the long-
term legitimacy of these institutions – a legitimacy that is prone to erosion with every 
report of corruption or perception thereof.”  
 
Local authorities are thus not exempt from this national malady and due to the 
system of appointment of its senior management is perhaps more prone thereto. The 
political elected council appoints a senior executive based on its values and terms of 
reference. The contention is not that all municipal councils or councillors are corrupt, 
but where the system allows for the abuse of political power the concern exists that 
the system itself can be corrupted. The power base of the ruling party can easily 
cause this type of corruption. 
 
225 Mr F S Mufamadi in foreword to Promoting Good Governance and Accountability. 
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It is therefore imperative to break this pattern. This can be done through the adoption 
of a management style in local authorities that focuses on the purpose of the 
authority and not the driving forces of the political machine. An ethical culture based 
on service of excellence on an equitable an expeditious basis is required and for that 
an ethical corporate culture needs to be nurtured. Officials need to develop the 
perception that the Batho Pele principle is real; that they are indeed the custodians 
and trustees for the wellbeing of the people they serve, with the emphasis on serve. 
Craythorne concludes by stating: “The challenge for local government is to produce 
a new breed of practitioner who will exhibit integrity of the highest degree and deal 
ruthlessly with any unethical conduct, any breach of morality and any waste of 
resources”226.  
 
The dynamics created through specific legislation to empower local authorities pose 
great challenges and in the recent past resulted in power struggles, socio-economic 
and political pressures, pressing local needs often based on irrational and unrealistic 
expectations. These will still take time to stabilise.   
 
Van der Waldt highlights but a few of the most significant challenges local 
government will have to contend with, including inexperienced and or uncommitted 
officials and political representatives as well as vested interests despite the dictates 
of section 56A of the Municipal Systems Act and an organisation culture not 
conducive to new realities and imperatives. This criticism finds support in Khan 
expressing the concerns experienced on intergovernmental level about the abilities 
of many municipalities, specifically the smaller local municipalities, to overcome their 
challenges and their need for able officials.  
 
Added to this, Craythorne refers to the need for able leadership. He points out that 
since 1993 the country has focussed on reconstruction, resulting in the three 
sphered government structure. It has, however, lost the “urgent need” for elective 
leadership. Regardless of whether an organisation is political or administrative – or 
both – it requires a leader to give it vision, direction and who has the ability to take 
the organisation forward227. In conclusion Craythorne refers to the American author 
226 311. 
227 311. 
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Maxwell’s laws. One cannot elect a formula and coerce all leaders into a single 
mould. Due to personal diversity that is not possible. People must be empowered to 
elect or appoint wisely and rationally leaders that have the clarity of vision and the 
ability to communicate that vision228. Once the electorate has been educated 
sufficiently to vote with their minds and not their sentiments, the political powers may 
well become aligned with the need for good governance and the appointment of the 
right and able administrative leaders who share a vision to the benefit of all. 
 
The municipal manager and managers reporting directly to the municipal manager 
are senior officials with a formidable job description with stringent performance 
requirements attached. They face a daunting tasks and the efficacy of their 
performance is very much in the public eye. To negate the concerns of insufficient 
ability expressed by Kahn et al and Craythorne the need exists to ensure the 
appointment of capable career administrators properly qualified for their jobs without 
undue political influence. The job requirements also demand continuity in service not 
possible with limited duration appointments. 
 
Municipal managers are appointed on limited duration contracts that coincide with 
the terms of the municipal councils and may not exceed that term by 12 months. The 
amended Local Government: Municipal Systems Act does not explicitly require that 
managers reported directly to the municipal manager should also be appointed on 
limited duration contracts. The political nature of the appointment of municipal 
managers coupled with the limited duration of such appointment is not conducive to 
career building in municipal management and often result in transient involvement 
with the exceedingly important task of provision of efficient service delivery at local 
government level. 
 
The long expected amendments to legislation pertaining to local government and 
more particularly the appointment of and terms and conditions applicable to 
municipal managers and managers reporting directly to municipal managers were 
adopted as legislation in 2011 and the effect of this legislation will only over time 
become noticeable.  
228 313. 
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 The State President has expressed the noble intention with the legislation to do 
away with the employment of a person because of reasons other than his or her 
abilities. Unfortunately the amendments still retain some of the maladies that give 
rise to the exercising of political expediencies. The appointment of a municipal 
manager and or section 56-managers may still be politically motivated and still 
makes for cadre employment and nepotism. The final selection of the municipal 
manager is still in the hands of an elected body with the same political affiliations and 
credo. The term of tenure is still fixed and may still result in the abuse of office to 
feather another nest with better future (political?) prospects. 
 
Bearing in mind that local authorities are on the front line of the political interface with 
voters, is dependent on common sources and has to contest with national and 
provincial government for such, much is expected from them in terms of service 
delivery and this service delivery can only manifest through the administration of 
efficient local government directed by municipal managers and those managers 
reporting directly to them. Kahn however pointed out that the transfer of funds to aid 
the municipalities is afflicted with a number of problems, the most important being 
the way in which funds are allocated and distributed and another the fact that 
municipalities are supposed to raise their own funding in various programmes – 
which most of the smaller municipalities cannot do. This result in an inability to 
attract the right personnel and to finance more ambitious fund raising programmes. 
 
Municipal managers are appointed by the council and managers reporting directly to 
the municipal manager by council in consultation with the municipal manager. Senior 
managers in municipal employ may not hold active political office whilst employed. 
 
Although job descriptions and performance requirements may differ from municipality 
to municipality in some detail, the Municipal Systems Act together with the Municipal 
Structures and Financial Structures Act prescribe to a large extent what the contracts 
and performance agreements of senior municipal managers should contain. The 
standard of performance, resulting in service delivery, is derived from the 
Constitution. 
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Performance agreements are the yardstick by which senior municipal managers are 
measured. In the case of the municipal manager, the measurement takes place 
through the council and in the case of section 56-appointees through the municipal 
manager. Although the criteria for measurement are well established and agreed 
upon, political influences and personal perceptions may still play a role and may 
adversely affect an evaluation due to certain aspects that cannot be measured 
objectively and may be subject to personal interpretations and circumstances.  
 
Senior municipal officials receive their delegated duties through legislation. In terms 
of this legislation they have to function efficiently on both the administrative level 
where services must be provided to the communities they serve; on the internal 
administrative level to ensure the optimum deployment of personnel and on the level 
where technical advice is required by the political structures. The efficacy of their 
performance, in the case of the municipal manager, is measured through the elected 
political structure which consists in most instances of lay people whose perceptions 
about the performances may be coloured by personal agendas and or unrelated 
exposure to organisations, which most probably would be less complicated than 
municipalities. 
 
The municipal manager is the face of the municipality and is required to represent 
the municipality as an organisation. 
 
Local government institutions are well regulated in terms of their conduct and 
required performance in keeping with the Constitution section 195. This conduct and 
performance criteria are contained in local authority legislation, codes and 
regulations that also provide for process and procedure in the event of a deviation 
from such. 
 
The agents of the local government institutions to manage these regulations and 
codes are the elected councils through their mayors and the municipal managers on 
the mandate of the council when managers reporting directly to the municipal 
manager are involved.  
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The criteria for selection and appointment of municipal managers and managers 
reporting directly to them are well described and their appointments are subject to 
the agreement and signing of performance agreements applicable to their positions. 
These agreements contain dispute resolution clauses augmented by Local 
Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers; the particular 
municipality disciplinary code and procedure as well as guidelines provided by 
SALGA. All these are regulated through section 69 of the Municipal Systems Act as 
well as the Performance Regulations. They deal with misconduct as well as poor 
performance issues. 
 
Senior managers have the right to refer disputes arising from the internal procedures 
and processes to the SALGBC dispute resolution unit, the CCMA and other 
accredited organisations. Amendments to labour legislation may in future impede on 
these rights due to the income threshold to be determined by the Minister of Labour. 
 
A fair amount of uncertainty and debate evolved about the course a dispute might 
take after the internal process. Recent CC rulings have provided more defined 
guidelines even though some are questioned by practitioners in the labour law and 
administrative law fraternities. Chirwa followed by Gcaba determined that matters 
pertaining to employment matters should be dealt with within the framework provided 
by the labour laws and not administrative laws and through the Labour Court system. 
 
In instances on record many of the actions taken against officials were based on 
political agendas and expediencies and matters thus arising have been referred to 
the courts resulting in costly and lengthy legal disputes. Inevitably the institutions 
suffered financial as well as service delivery consequences.  
 
A municipal manager’s appointment is linked to that of council and the possibility that 
the manager may not be appointed by a council with another composition was 
proven slim in the past, impacting negatively on career building and continuity in 
management practices. 
 
It is thus suggested that the limited tenure of appointment of senior municipal 
managers be removed; that real and stringent effect be given to the requirement 
72 
 
contained in the Municipal Systems Act that only suitably qualified persons be 
appointed as senior municipal managers; that the appointment of these managers be 
removed from the political arena (to give effect to the sentiments expressed by the 
State President on the acceptance of the amendments in 2011); that their 
performance be assessed through professionally qualified assessors – peer group 
and or professionals in the respective fields of expertise – and attention be given to 
conditions that will promote the ideal of career building within local authorities. 
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6.5 Addendum 
 
6.5.1 Performance Agreement between the Mkhambathini Municipality, represented 
by its mayor, Mrs Thobekile Ethel Maphumulo and Mr Devan Anthony, the 
Municipal Manager, for the financial year 1 July 2012 – 30 June 2013. 
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